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Abstract  
 
Lack of accessible clean water impacts millions of people around the world. Throughout 
the 1990s, the privatization of developing countries’ water sectors was seen as a way to improve 
inefficient and ineffective water service. While many of the privatization projects failed, it is 
important to assess the possibility of learning from these mistakes, and better utilizing private 
sector support as a tool to address global water deficiencies. I set out to show that water 
privatization can be an effective tool to address urban water needs if the process is conducted 
correctly. Through the completion of three case studies, I am able to learn from the successes and 
failures of past projects. The knowledge learned from these studies shows that the way in which 
a privatization is undertaken greatly affects the outcome of the project. The paper concludes that 
while privatization could greatly improve the lives of citizens living in urban areas who suffer 
from water deficiencies, privatization will not greatly influence the water crisis due to the 
inability to implement the process in rural areas.      
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Introduction  
This thesis will attempt to assess the viability of water privatization as a policy tool to 
address water issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. Privatization was pushed by the World Bank 
throughout the 1990s, but often failed to bring about the expected improvements. This thesis 
seeks to see if water privatization is a poor model, or a model that if altered, could help to 
address global water deficiencies.  
This paper will look at the history of the privatization of water resources in order to learn 
from past projects. Chapter One lays out the current water problems faced by millions around the 
world. It focuses on urban issues as well as issues specific to the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This discussion of the current situation illustrates the need for major policy and investment in 
order to address global water deficiencies. Chapter Two looks at the history of privatization with 
special focus on the privatization of water. Chapter Three examines the major players within the 
privatization process. Chapter Four looks at three case studies of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
that privatized their water services. The countries are Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana. Chapter Five 
presents the findings from the case studies, and makes suggestions for conditions that if met 
would make future privatizations more successful. The information learned from the case studies 
will show that while privatization will not be a solution for the global water crisis, if 
implemented effectively, it could serve as a policy tool to help address urban water deficiencies. 
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Chapter One: The Global Water Crisis 
 
Labeling the current global water situation as anything other than a crisis would be to 
downplay the severity of the problem. Globally, 780 million people lack access to clean water. 
This deficiency, and the subsequent diseases caused by the use of unsafe water, results in 
roughly 3.41 million deaths per year.1 These numbers can be hard to fathom in a world that 
seems to be covered in water. Of all of the water on the planet, only 2.5 percent is freshwater. Of 
this, roughly 70 percent is locked in ice caps, 30 percent is stored underground, and only 0.3 
percent of water is easily accessibly in rivers and lakes.2 While working to conserve our 
freshwater resources is an important aspect to consider, currently the focus should be on the 
unequal distribution and allocation of this fresh water. People without readily available access to 
fresh water, and without the infrastructure to access water underground, must often walk miles in 
order to secure enough water for all their needs. In urban areas, people rarely have to walk far 
distances to collect their water, but often are forced to pay high prices to access the resource. 
The region of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) provides the greatest insight into these water 
issues. While most regions throughout the world have seen great improvement in water 
coverage, SSA currently stands at only 61 percent of the region having access to an improved 
drinking water source.3 An improved drinking source is defined by the WHO/UNICEF Joint 
Monitoring Program (JMP) as, “one that, by nature of its construction or through active 
intervention, is protected from outside contamination, in particular from contamination with 
                                                
1"Water Facts." Water.org. N.p., 2013. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://water.org/water-crisis/water-facts/water/>. 
2 "Water Resources." UN Water. The United Nations, n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www.unwater.org/statistics_res.html>. 
3 Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update. Rep. UNICEF/WHO, 2012. 4. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www.unicef.org/media/files/JMPreport2012.pdf>. 
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faecal matter.”4 Additionally, of all the inhabitants of SSA, only 16 percent have access to piped 
water on their premises, the lowest percentage of any region in the world.5 
Due to the economic cost of supplying a large number of people with the service, the 
privatization of water resources can only occur in urban areas. In rural areas, people are too 
widely dispersed to make water extension economically attractive to private companies. Due to 
this, this thesis will focus on urban water issues. The United Nations (UN) projects that as of 
2011, 47 percent of the population in the developing world lived in urban areas. This number is 
expected to increase to 64 percent of the total population by 2050.6 Improved water supply 
coverage is high in urban areas at 96 percent with 80 percent of the population having access to 
piped water connections. While these numbers are good, it is important to note that between 
1990 and 2010 the global urban population saw the number of people using an unapproved water 
source increase from 109 to 130 million people.7 This shows that as the global urban population 
continues to grow, there must be continued investment in urban areas even if coverage seems to 
be high. It is especially important to look at the poorest urban dwellers who are more likely to 
lack access to water supply and rely on unimproved sources. 
While it seems that the urban population has a high level of water coverage, when the 
JMP looked at 35 countries in SSA (84 percent of the total regional population), and broke the 
averages down into quintiles based on wealth, a different story emerged. It was found that in 
urban areas, 94 percent of the richest quintile has access to an improved water source while the 
                                                
4 "Introduction." WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation. JMP, 2010. 
Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/introduction/>. 
5 Ibid., p. 8 
6 World Urbanization Prospects The 2011 Revision. Rep. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Mar. 2012. 2. 
Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://esa.un.org/unup/pdf/WUP2011_Highlights.pdf>. 
7 Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update, p. 12 
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poorest quintile has only 64 percent coverage.8 What this breakdown shows is that while the 
global urban population does have a higher level of coverage compared to the global rural 
population, when the numbers are broken down based on region and income the urban 
population still has many issues that must still be addressed. 
The lack of access to water across SSA results in many difficulties including issues with 
health, education, gender equity, and economic development. It is only when all of these issues 
are viewed holistically that the full burden faced by those without access can be completely 
understood. 
 
Health 
 One of the greatest burdens faced by those without clean water is the impact on their 
health. Numerous diseases, including diarrhea, pneumonia, Guinea Worm, Cholera, and 
Schistosomiasis are all caused by lack of clean water. Additionally, many health issues are 
indirectly hurt by poor water. Malaria, caused by mosquitoes, is supported by the presence of 
sitting water. Also, people with HIV/AIDS are more susceptible to water related diseases and 
have a more difficult time recovering from such infections.9 Many of these diseases are more 
common in rural areas, but urban areas also see pneumonia and diarrhea as major problems. This 
is especially true in informal settlements where there is a high population density with limited 
services. 
 The high prevalence of these diseases has an incredible influence on economics. 
Globally, if the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of cutting in half the number of people 
                                                
8 Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update, p. 29 
9 "Common Water and Sanitation-related Diseases." Unicef.org. UNICEF, 17 June 2003. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www.unicef.org/wash/index_wes_related.html>. 
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without access to basic water and sanitation was met, there would be a savings of seven billion 
dollars in the health sector.10 If improvements occurred beyond the MDGs, and basic access to 
water and sanitation was extended across SSA, US $610 million, or seven percent of the region's 
total costs, would be cut from the regional health costs.11 These savings, coupled with increases 
in productivity in the workforce and extended life expectancy, could dramatically alter the 
economic landscape of the region. 
 Children living without access to clean water face the greatest health struggles, especially 
those under the age of five years old. Globally, pneumonia (18 percent) is the leading cause of 
death for children under five years old. Not far behind is diarrhea (11 percent), which is the third 
leading cause of death.12 In a survey conducted in 2008, Africa had 4.199 million deaths of 
children under the age of five. Of those, 19 percent were caused by diarrhea and 18 percent were 
caused pneumonia.13 These problems are more significant in SSA, where a child under the age of 
five is 16.5 percent more likely to die before their fifth birthday than their peers in developed 
regions.14 
 With improved water for drinking, and an emphasis on hand washing, many of these 
pneumonia and diarrheal cases could be prevented. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
estimates that if the MDG of cutting in half those without access to clean water and basic 
                                                
10 Sanctuary, M., H. Tropp, and A. Berntell. Making Water a Part of Economic Development. Rep. Stockholm 
International Water Institute, n.d. 33. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/waterandmacroecon.pdf>. 
11 Human Development Report 2006. Rep. United Nations Development Programme, 2006. 43 Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf>. 
12 "Children: Reducing Mortality." who.int. World Health Organization, Sept. 2012. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs178/en/index.html>. 
13 Black, Robert E., et al. Global, Regional, and National Causes of Child Mortality in 2008: A Systematic Analysis. 
Rep. Child Health Epidemiology Reference Group of WHO and UNICEF, 12 May 2012. 7. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://wwwlive.who.int/immunization_monitoring/diseases/Lancet_2010_withAppendix.pdf>. 
14 “Children: Reducing Mortality”  
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sanitation was met, there would be a global reduction in diarrheal cases of about ten percent.15 
Additionally, a study was done to assess the cost-benefit of different levels of intervention in the 
water and sanitation sectors. The study found that if the MDG was met, and the number of 
people without access to improved water and sanitation was cut in half, the value of deaths 
avoided due to intervention would be US $3.56 billion/year in future earnings.16 
 Looking at the Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) statistic helps to quantify just how 
much of an impact improvements in the water sector can have on health. The WHO defines: 
One DALY [can be thought of] as one lost year of "healthy" life. The sum of these 
DALYs across the population, or the burden of disease, can be thought of as a 
measurement of the gap between current health status and an ideal health situation where 
the entire population lives to  an advanced age, free of disease and disability.17 
 
Due to poor water, and the closely related issue of inadequate sanitation, being associated with 
so many different diseases, the number of DALYs are high. The WHO estimates that diseases 
caused by poor water and sanitation result in 60 million DALYs every year. This accounts for 
four percent of the total global DALYs.18 Looking at the time saved from illness can help to 
measure the costs and benefits of improving infrastructural. Due to the high cost associated with 
water and sanitation infrastructure, it is important to assess the associated benefit of the project 
prior to implementation. In a study conducted for the WHO, it was found that when viewed in 
terms of the days saved from illness, both in terms of working and schooling, the cost benefit of 
water and sanitation improvements was high across all regions and types of intervention. It was 
                                                
15 "Costs and Benefits of Water and Sanitation Improvements at the Global Level (Evaluation of The)." WHO. 
World Health Organization, 2004. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/wsh0404summary/en/index.html>. 
16 Hutton, Guy, and Laurence Haller. Evaluation of the Costs and Benefits of Water and Sanitation Improvements at 
the Global Level. Rep. World Health Organization, 2004. 33-34. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/wsh0404.pdf>. 
17 "Metrics: Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY)." Who.int. World Health Organization, 2013. Web. 28 Apr. 
2013. <http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/metrics_daly/en/>. 
18 Human Development Report 2006, p. 45   
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estimated that a US $1 investment would yield a return of between US $5 and US $11 depending 
on region and type of intervention.19 
 
Education 
 While young children face great health risks due to lack of clean water, when they do 
make it past their fifth birthday, health issues caused by lack of accessible and clean water results 
in roughly 443 million school days lost every year.20 This is significant because it has been 
shown that educated households benefit from faster reductions in poverty and increased growth 
when compared to uneducated households.21 If the water crisis, felt almost exclusively in 
developing countries, is hindering future household education levels, there will be a much more 
difficult path to development. 
 When children are in school, many are suffering from health issues that directly affect 
their ability to learn. UNICEF reports that there are millions of children around the world who 
are either unable to attend school, or are present but unproductive, due to water related 
diseases.22 This issue of missing school is significant because too many school days lost can 
result in students dropping out. Intervention could make a significant difference as it has been 
found that if the MDG was met, and half the people without access to improved water and 
sanitation gained access, 272 million school days would be gained per year solely from the 
decreased prevalence of diarrhea.23 
                                                
19 Hutton and Haller, p. 39 
20 Human Development Report 2006, p. 6 
21 Appleton, Simon. Education, Incomes and Poverty in Uganda in the 1990s. Publication. Centre for Research in 
Economic Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham, Dec. 2001. 4. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/credit/documents/papers/01-22.pdf>. 
22 Sanctuary, Tropp and Berntell, p. 14 
23 Hutton and Haller, p. 29 
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 Girls are at a high risk for dropping out of school due to lack of water supply and 
sanitation facilities. When girls reach puberty, they often are forced to miss school due to their 
educational settings not having the necessary sanitation facilities. Without access to a separate 
and private space, girls stay home. This eventually adds up to a large number of school days 
missed and it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to catch up on missed material. 24 This only 
adds to the educational achievement gap often found between boys and girls.   
 All of the issues discussed show the strong connection between water deficiencies and 
education. Around the world, children are being kept from school due to insufficient water and 
sanitation services. If this were addressed, the issues of an uneducated future workforce and 
gender inequality would both be addressed. While it was discussed that girls are 
disproportionately impacted by lack of accessible water and sanitation facilities in the education 
setting, they also face other issues in the sector due to their gender. 
 
Gender Equity  
 When a community lacks an accessible water source, the burden falls especially hard on 
women. The most common issue is the need to walk to collect their family’s daily water needs. 
A survey of 25 SSA countries found that in 71 percent of families without an accessible water 
source, women and girls were the primary family members responsible for water collection.25 
This need to collect water is more prevalent in rural areas, where water sources are far apart. In 
urban areas, women have fewer challenges finding an accessible water point, but their gender 
still impacts their experience in the sector.  
                                                
24 "Gender and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene(WASH)." Unicef.org. UNICEF, n.d. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www.unicef.org/esaro/7310_Gender_and_WASH.html>. 
25 Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update, p. 31 
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 While women face challenges, their increased participation in the water and sanitation 
sectors would be beneficial to future projects. A study done across 88 communities, in 15 
countries, found that the projects that better took into account the voices of men and women, 
across varied income levels, were more sustainable.26 This study came from the idea that men 
and women, and the needs of the poor and rich, greatly differ. Women require more privacy than 
men and the poor have economic constraints on what they can afford to pay for services. If all 
voices are included in the conversation, from planning to implementation, the project will have a 
better chance of being sustained.  
 While urban women face fewer challenges than their rural counterparts, their inclusion in 
the water sector could greatly alter the success of projects. The needs of women must be better 
focused on if the water and sanitation sectors, along with overall development, are to improve. 
 
Economics 
 The statistics presented above show the need for improvements, as well as the daunting 
task in expanding water and sanitation coverage. If the problem is viewed solely in terms of the 
economic implications, it is clear that there are great opportunities for gains. The WHO estimates 
that in order to provide all of Africa with access to improved water and sanitation it would cost 
US $4.043 billion per year. While high, the economic benefit would be US $44.036 Billion per 
year. This results in an annual cost/benefit ratio of 10.89.27 While needed investments are high, 
the economic benefit felt through improvements is significantly higher. These benefits would be 
seen within the growth of the economy. It has been found that, “poor countries with improved 
                                                
26 Gross, Bruce, Christine Van Wijk, and Nilanjana Mukherjee. Linking Sustainability with Demand, Gender and 
Poverty. Rep. Water and Sanitation Program, Dec. 2000. 19. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www.wsp.org/sites/wsp.org/files/publications/global_plareport.pdf>. 
27 Sanctuary, Tropp and Berntell, p. 34 
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access to clean water and sanitation services enjoyed annual average growth of 3.7%...similarly 
poor countries but without improved access had average annual per capita GDP growth of only 
0.1%.”28 The correlation between water access and economic development is clear. 
 
Conclusion 
 The current global water crisis impacts the health, education, gender equity, and 
economics of developing countries around the world. The issue is especially problematic in SSA 
where lack of infrastructure and available investment prohibit any real improvements and instead 
leave those without access suffering. As the global population continues to grow, and water 
resources available remain constant, the time is now to make significant investments in the 
sector. One potential solution is a return to the age of water privatization that characterized the 
1990s. While the projects of the 1990s are now largely seen as failures, it is important to 
question if the privatization of water resources can be altered and successful, or if it will only 
continue to perpetuate inequality and poverty. The answer to this question could greatly alter 
future development policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
28 Sanctuary, Tropp and Berntell, p. 40 
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Chapter Two: A History of Privatization 
 
 Privatization evokes strong opinions from both sides of the debate. To understand the 
rapid growth of privatization projects, one must go back to the 1980s and understand the 
economic climate of the world. By starting in the 1980s, and moving to present time, one can 
better understand the motives for privatizing public service sectors (ex: water, electricity, gas 
etc). Specifically, water privatization projects have had mixed results, but the public sentiment 
has been largely negative. Looking at the growth of water privatization, and the arguments for 
and against the process, will allow for a better understanding of how the process can better serve 
all parties involved.   
 
Economic Climate 1980-1990  
 A recession experienced throughout the 1970s led to the 1980s and an emphasis on 
neoliberal policies. When President Ronald Reagan was elected to office in 1980, he sought to 
revert from previous administration’s policies and adopt an economic policy focused on free 
market ideology.29 The overbearing presence of government intervention in economic affairs was 
seen as a major factor in the problems on the 1970s. It was at this moment that people began to 
argue that if the government stepped back and allowed for markets to function without 
intervention, there would be a period of growth and an increase in the overall standard of 
living.30 This belief was coined Neoliberalism and one of the main pillars was privatization. 
                                                
29 Kemp, Tom. The Climax of Capitalism: The US Economy in the Twentieth Century. London: Longman, 1990. 
204. Print. 
30 Kiely, Ray. Empire in the Age of Globalisation: US Hegemony and Neoliberal Disorder. London: Pluto, 2005. 95. 
Print. 
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 In 1989, economist John Williamson coined the term “Washington Consensus” to 
describe his list of ten principles that most of Washington could agree on as policy for 
development in Latin America. Williamson believed that the original neoliberal policies, 
championed by President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, were largely gone with one 
exception: privatization.31 While initially the term was confined to the ten principles which were 
meant to be applied to a specific region, over time the “Washington Consensus” was used as a 
term to characterize all the neoliberal policies from the Reagan and Thatcher era. Additionally, it 
was used to characterize the policies of the World Bank and IMF for all developing countries 
rather than the one specific region.32 This highlights one of the defining issues of development 
policy during this time period, which was that the path to economic development was 
streamlined into a uniform process for all countries.  Regardless of a country’s initial level of 
development, or its specific needs, it was believed that these policies were the solution. As can 
be expected, these policies were not the panacea for development ills, but in many cases left the 
people of developing countries worse off than they were prior to reform.33 
The policies that guided the Washington Consensus were fiscal austerity, privatization, 
and market liberalization. Fiscal austerity involves gaining control of spending and implementing 
more disciplined fiscal decision-making. Privatization, which will be discussed more in depth 
below, is the process of turning a previously government run sector over to private operators in 
an attempt to make the operations more efficient.34 Finally, liberalization is, “the removal of 
                                                
31 Williamson, John. A Short History of the Washington Consensus. Working paper. Institute for International 
Economics, 24 Sept. 2004. 2. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf>. 
32 Williamson, John. "The Washington Consensus and Beyond." Economic and Political Weekly 38.15 (2003): 
1476. Jstor. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/4413431>. 
33 Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002. 16. Print. 
34 Ibid., p. 53 
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government interferences in financial markets, capital markets, and barriers to trade.”35 In his 
book, Globalization and its Discontents, Joseph Stiglitz argues that these policies had an adverse 
impact on developing countries because they were pushed too far and too fast.36 When looking at 
the case studies in Chapter Four, and the findings in Chapter Five, I concur with his belief that 
the pace and way which in which privatization is implemented impacts the outcome of a 
privatization project.37       
 The reliance on these policies exposes another theme of development, which was the 
frequency of policies being prescribed by the global North for the global South. This split is 
defined as the separation between developed and developing nations, which also corresponds to 
their geographic location. Development has followed a similar path where organizations of the 
North such as the World Bank, IMF, and other development agencies have significant power 
over the fragile developing countries of the South. Developing countries follow the lead of these 
institutions because they need help and access to capital. The problem is these organizations are 
led by elites who all too often are looking out for commercial and financial of the North rather 
than the needs of the voiceless South.38 
 
Privatization of Services  
 There are varying types of privatization, with differing levels of corporate control. There 
are three types of contracts used for the privatization of a service sector: concession, lease, and 
management. Under a concession contract, the private company is fully responsible for running 
the sector and making all needed investments. A lease contract requires that the private operator 
                                                
35 Ibid., p. 59 
36 Ibid., p. 54 
37 Ibid., p. 54 
38 Ibid., p. 18-22 
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run the day-to-day operations and make needed investments in existing infrastructure. The 
government is responsible for all new investment costs. Finally, under a management contract, 
the private operator manages the operations but is not responsible for any investment.39 As will 
be seen in the three case studies, these definitions serve as guidelines, but individual projects 
alter the conditions of the contract for their individual needs. For the purpose of this paper, the 
term “privatization” will refer to any form of private participation as described above. 
 While each country may have unique reasons for privatization, the motives can usually be 
traced back to a desire to improve services, a need to alleviate government costs, and/or due to 
pressure from outside sources.  
 A country that is suffering from poor services may choose to privatize public sectors in 
hopes of seeing improvements. There is a generally accepted belief that private companies have 
access to capital, and means of investment, that allow them to infuse more money into the sector 
than cash-strapped governments. A World Bank study of 79 privatized firms in 21 developing 
countries found that profitability, efficiency, and output all increased when the firms moved from 
public to private ownership.40 While the World Bank may have only chosen projects that it 
believed would be successful, it still shows that privatization can have a positive impact on 
inefficient or ineffective sectors.  
 Another reason a country may go through the process of privatizing its resources is that 
the government has limited capital and privatization allows for the government to free up money 
for other services and needs. When the private sector takes on some level of control and 
                                                
39 Barlow, Maude. Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for the Right to Water. New 
York: New, 2007. 39-40 Print. 
40 Boubakri, Narjess, and Jean-Claude Cosset. Privatization in Developing Countries. Publication no. 156. The 
World Bank, Nov. 1998. 1. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282884-1303327122200/156cosse.pdf>. 
 
 
 
19 
responsibility for delivering services, it brings in capital that the government cannot afford. The 
same World Bank study cited above found that the capital investment to sales ratio went up from 
10.5 percent to 23.7 percent after privatization.41 This illustrates the notion that when privatized, 
a sector has greater capital investment. 
 While improved services and increased capital investment are intended benefits of 
privatization, many countries are forced to privatize their resources under pressure from the 
World Bank. This pressure has come most notably under World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs). Under these programs, the World Bank agrees to alter existing loans that 
developing countries cannot repay. In return for the adjustment to the loan, countries often must 
sell its public services to private companies.42 The influence of both the World Bank will be 
addressed more in Chapter Three when the major players of water privatization are discussed. 
 
Privatization Process  
 When a government decides to privatize a previously public service, there are stages that 
are generally followed in order to facilitate the process. First, the government develops a plan for 
the privatization. It is during this stage that an outline consisting of the government and private 
operator’s roles is formulated as well as defining the goals of privatization. The next step is to 
construct the details of the process. During this stage, there is more formulation on the expected 
outcomes and how costs will be recovered. The third step consists of picking the service 
operator. This process is vital in terms of future success or failure of the project. The project 
must be presented in a way that is attractive to the best providers in terms of their ability and fit 
with the country’s needs. Finally, the fourth step is to manage the arrangement and actually 
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begin the era of privatization.43 The better executed these four steps, the better chance of private 
sector success. 
 In looking at step three of the process, the way in which an operator is selected is 
important for both the validity of project and the chance of success. There are three generally 
utilized methods for selecting an operator. The first option is competitive bidding in which 
companies submit bids with an outline of their plan for the project and the cost to implement 
their strategy. This process is seen as the most transparent, but has the highest risk for receiving 
low bids in order to win the contract. Some processes use a competitive negotiations approach 
where negotiations go back and forth between the government and the group submitting a bid. 
The back and forth nature of this process results in decreased transparency, but the increased 
input from the government helps in reducing the possibility of low bids. Finally, the third form of 
choosing an operator is through direct negotiations. With direct negotiations, the process usually 
stems from the private provider submitting a project proposal rather than the government seeking 
project ideas. While costs are lowered due to the removal of the bidding component, this process 
is seen as the most susceptible to corruption and lack of transparency.44 
 While this process was supported by the World Bank, SSA has had limited experience 
with privatization. The total number of privatization sales went from 175 in 1990 to 2,200 in 
1998. These sales, totaled US $9 billion, and only accounted for 3 percent of all developing 
countries’ proceeds during the 1990s.45 While privatization schemes have continued to develop 
in the region during the early years of the 21st century, SSA has much less experience with 
privatization than other regions. Obviously the sector has even less experience when solely 
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44 Ibid., p. 168-170 
45 Kikeri, Sunita, and John Nellis. An Assessment of Privatization. Vol. 19 No.1. The World Bank, 2004. 92. Web. 
28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.nioclibrary.ir/privatization/e008.pdf>. 
 
 
21 
looking at water privatization. This is significant in terms of its impact on future water 
privatization projects. With SSA being the region most in need of water sector improvements, 
there are fewer cases to learn from that take into account the unique conditions of the region. 
This makes the small sample size of private water projects even more significant to learn from 
for future projects. 
 
The Privatization of Water 
 The modern push to privatize water began in 1989 when British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher sold control of the United Kingdom's water sector to private companies. The Thatcher 
privatization opened the door for an increase in water privatization projects around the world. 
Prior to the UK’s water privatization, $300 million was spent worldwide on water privatization 
(1984-1990). This is minimal when compared to the $24 billion used to fund water privatization 
projects between 1990 and 1997.46 After 1997, there was a clear decline in privatization projects 
in large part caused by financial crises in Russia, Argentina, and across Asia that resulted in 
decreased foreign direct investment.47 Water projects were not spared from the crisis. After the 
height of investment of roughly US $10 billion in 1997, investments in water and sanitation 
projects dropped and fell as low as US $2 billion in 2001 (see Chart One in the Appendix).48 
After the financial crisis, and when economic activity and investment re-emerged, the water 
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sector saw the least amount of funds for utilities due to the high capital-investment needed for 
water projects.49 
 Privatization of the water sector has unique needs due to water supply being a natural 
monopoly. A natural monopoly exists, “when a single firm can supply a good or service to an 
entire market at a lower cost than could two or more firms”.50 Water services are a prime 
example of a natural monopoly. Water service provision requires a large amount of infrastructure 
at a high cost. It is much less expensive to have one firm with one set of pipes rather than two or 
more firms building multiple sets of needed infrastructure.51 With only one provider for the 
entire service, governments must implement a system of regulation in order to ensure fair 
practices. It is important to note that while the case studies utilize a two firm approach (one 
public and one private), they are working together with one set of infrastructure. People do not 
have the choice between the two firms but rather must rely on the two to work together to 
provide one service option. When the services are privatized it is essential that there is an 
independent regulator to limit monopolistic power.52 
It should be emphasized that water privatization only occurs in urban areas. While this 
process has the potential to help urban citizens gain better access to water services, being a 
policy option solely for urban areas is problematic for a few reasons. First, as discussed in 
Chapter One, rural areas around the world are disproportionately impacted by lack of clean water 
and adequate sanitation. Rural citizens lack the connections to water sources and thus must travel 
great distances in order to access clean water. When privatization projects are undertaken, all 
finances allocated for the project are then directed to urban areas that already have access to 
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more services and more finances than their rural counterparts.53 Privatization has been hailed as 
the solution to the water crisis but this is impossible if projects do not even target the geographic 
areas most in need. Instead, privatization should be assessed based on the possibility of 
contributing, but not solving, the global water crisis.  
 The growing water crisis, and high capital investment needed for water sector 
improvements make privatization an appealing option. That being said, the need for water in 
order to sustain life in a way other natural monopolies do not has made water privatization a 
heated debate. Both those in favor and opposed to privatization make valid points that are 
important to consider.   
 
Arguments For and Against Privatization 
 There are numerous debates between those for, and those against, water privatization. 
The first debate is over whether the private sector can better manage the delivery of a service or 
if their desire for profit maximization hurts the sector. The second debate is over whether water 
should be viewed as an economic or social good. The third argument is over how water should 
be priced. Finally, there is debate about the impact of privatization on the labor force. Looking at 
these four debates helps one to understand why this is such a heated topic.   
     
Private Sector Participation: Efficiency or Profit  
 One of the strongest arguments for water privatization is that up to this point 
governments have failed to provide the needed investment to extend and improve water 
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resources. Government’s inability to finance and provide extended infrastructure has left a large 
percentage of countries populations without the most basic water and sanitation services Those 
in favor of privatization argue that when a private company enters the sector, they are able to 
provide financing, contribute a higher level of knowledge of the sector, and provide the service 
across a larger area at a higher quality than the public sector.54 While the commonly held belief 
that privatize companies have access to increased knowledge, capital, and management 
transcends sectors, the impact of this capital can only be understood when looking at individual 
country case studies.   
 A major concern of those against privatization is that a private company's primary focus 
is profit maximization. This leads companies to do what is in the best interest of their bottom line 
even if it means that the water needs of all citizens are not met. Any private company is going to 
enter the sector and ensure that prices are set to so that their profit margin satisfies the 
stakeholders within the company. This means that the short-term profit maximization is valued 
more than the long-term needs of the community and the sustainability of the resource.55 
 The water market is attractive to corporations due to the increasing scarcity of the good. 
In 2003, the Palisades Global Water Index was created and is, “comprised of companies traded 
on stock exchanges worldwide that are positioned to benefit significantly from the escalating 
global demand for water and the ecological imperative of sustainable water resource 
governance.”56 In order to be included within the index water companies must meet three 
requirements: 
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● A minimum total market capitalization of US$150 million.  
● A traded volume greater than 100,000 shares for each of the prior three months.  
● A minimum average daily traded value of US$500,000 for the prior three months.57 
 
 
From inception through 2007, the growth of the index has averaged 18.7 percent every year.58 
This is index illustrates the increased awareness of the growing investment opportunities 
connected to the water sector. There must be a balance between the private operator providing its 
knowledge and ensuring the company makes enough profit for the participation to be 
worthwhile.   
 
Economic Good or Human Right 
 Advocates for privatization argue that water is an economic good, and should be treated 
as such. The first time water was deemed an economic good was during the 1992 International 
Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in Dublin, Ireland. What came out of this 
meeting is commonly known as the Dublin Principles. The fourth principle states that, “Water 
has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic 
good.”59 
 This distinction as an economic good makes sense because there is a cost for ensuring 
water is clean and delivering that water to a source for use. Opponents of privatization argue that 
while water may include economic issues, there is a social component as well that private 
companies may ignore. Without water, humans cannot survive. It is this life sustaining nature of 
water that causes some to look at water as a human rights issue. This belief has been supported 
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by the UN. In 2010, the UN passed a resolution that put the emphasis on water as a right. In the 
resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly it was stated that, “Safe and clean drinking 
water and sanitation is a human right essential to the full enjoyment of life and all other human 
rights.”60 While this is an important step, UN General Assembly decisions are only 
recommendations, and while influential, cannot dictate the way in which a country abides by or 
rejects the decisions.61  
While recognizing the importance of water as a right, there can be no denying the 
economic qualities of water. Finding the balance between the good as both an economic 
commodity and a human right has an impact on how water is delivered and at what price.  
 
Water Pricing  
The debate over whether water is an economic or social good impacts the decision over 
how water is priced. Many people focused on the economic aspects of water argue that water 
should be delivered at a level of full cost recovery. In a full cost recovery system, there are three 
costs that must be accounted for. First, there are the day-to-day needs to supply water often 
defined as the operator costs. The next cost is covering depreciation. As a system ages, it loses its 
value and is more likely need repair. Depreciation costs account for the potential for those 
needed improvements. The third cost is “return on capital” which is where funds need to be 
collected in order to pay interest on debt needed to build the project or a return of equity.62 
Around the world, countries are supplying water at a price that is below full cost recovery. This 
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means there is no capital for investment, and when infrastructure fails, there is no way to pay for 
needed repairs.       
Others argue that supplying water at full cost recovery would leave a large percentage of 
the population without the ability to pay for a basic human need. One solution to concern over 
pricing water at an unaffordable level has been to implement subsidies. There are three ways to 
use subsidies in the water market. First, there is the implementation of a cross-subsidy where the 
revenue from some customers helps to cover the cost of other customers. Next is the 
implementation of a tax collected from the government. Finally, the allocation of grants from 
international development groups can help cut costs.63 While in many places subsidies are 
keeping the cost of water affordable, it should be noted that in the developing world US $45 
billion is spent annually in order to subsidize water.64 There must be a way to make the delivery 
of water supply more efficient and less expensive while ensuring governments do not need to 
utilize a large amount of their resources for subsidies. The cross subsidy and use of funds from 
development organizations will be assessed in two of the three case studies discussed in Chapter 
Four.  
 As with many debates, there are valid points on both sides of the argument. Water should 
be viewed as an economic good due to the cost of collecting and delivering the service. At the 
same time, it should not be ignored that water is a vital human need. As will be seen in the case 
studies, a balance must be struck between providing the good at a price that ensures the sector is 
financially stable and creating social programs so the poorest citizens still have access.    
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Impact on Employment 
 Another issue of contention is the notion that privatization increases unemployment. This 
is due to the fact that government run sectors often have higher employment levels than is 
efficient. Due to the desire to increase overall welfare in society, extra workers are hired to the 
point where their marginal cost is greater than their marginal revenue.65 This leads to a high level 
of inefficiency where sectors have more employees per customer than is needed. A World Bank 
economist argued that this is especially true for, “enterprises that have operated as monopolies 
with heavy government subsidies and other forms of protection.”66 This description is especially 
characteristic of the water sector. 
 Additionally, these excess workers are often paid higher wages with greater benefits than 
under private sector control. The profit maximization condition of private companies ensures that 
private operators do not pay workers more than necessary in order to keep costs down and profits 
up. In many cases where wages have decreased, benefits have increased in order to make up for 
the wage decline.67 These exorbitant benefits are diminished when the private sector takes over 
control. 
 While it is without argument that public enterprises often support extra laborers, at higher 
wages than under private sector control, the overall impact on unemployment is subject to 
debate. On one side, a survey of 308 privatization projects (across sectors) found that after 
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privatization 78.4 percent of firms reduced employment.68 While significant, others have been 
quick to argue that while initially unemployment may rise, increased investment and 
improvement of the sector due to private control leads to increased employment in the long run.69 
Without much knowledge on length of unemployment or level of subsequent employment 
secured there will be continued debate on to what extent the transition to private operation 
impacts employment. 
 
Conclusion   
 Privatization is a contentious issue that will continue to be debated. The life sustaining 
nature of water makes the issue of the privatization of water resources an even bigger debate than 
when looking at the privatization of other service sector. While governments should be providing 
this human need to all its citizens, the economic cost of the infrastructure needed to supply 
everyone with piped water is too high for countries with weak economies. This lack of capital is 
the case across much of SSA. Many factors intersect with this lack of capital and will be 
discussed when looking at the case studies in Chapter Four. First, Chapter Three will look at the 
major players in the process of privatization. Understanding the different motives and 
experiences of the most influential players in the privatization process will help to see where 
concessions can be made to make the most viable and create an environment with the greatest 
chance of success for water sector improvements. 
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Chapter Three: The Players in the Privatization Process 
 
 By looking at each group of actors in the privatization process, we can begin to 
understand the motives and needs that guide their decision-making. As expected, the groups with 
more financial power possess more influence over the structure and how the process is carried 
out. The groups that have the greatest need for support must give up more in order having their 
needs met. Finally, the people who have the most at stake, the citizens of the country, are often 
completely left out of the decision making process. 
 
The World Bank 
 The World Bank was created in 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire as part of the 
Bretton Woods Conference. At the time of conception, the Bank's main focus was rebuilding 
Europe after World War II. When the Marshall Plan was introduced, the World Bank changed 
directions and began its goal of assisting developing countries.70 It should be noted that the 
structure of the World Bank puts voting power in the hands of the countries that contribute the 
most financially. These First World countries have control over who gets loans and under what 
conditions those loans are granted.71 This is important because the poor must seek assistance 
from the rich who have their own motives to satisfy. 
 While many development organizations and banks have financially supported the 
emphasis on privatization, the World Bank's role in encouraging this process is significant. In the 
1980s the World Bank switched strategies to satisfy the conditions of the Washington Consensus 
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discussed in Chapter Two. With this move, the World Bank began the era of Structural 
Adjustment Programs.72 
  Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were designed to help solve the debt problem of 
the Third World. These SAPs were implemented to encourage the policies of the Washington 
Consensus.73 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) is the branch 
of the World Bank that has the power to provide countries loans with privatization stipulations.74 
Over time, many Third World countries had borrowed money from the World Bank at low 
interest rates and were unable to pay-off their debt when interest rates rose. The World Bank's 
solution was to forgive these debts as long as the indebted country agreed to privatize its public 
institutions and services.75 The countries are put into an impossible situation where they need 
their loans forgiven and have no real choice other than to give up their public resources. 
 The other branch of the World Bank involved in privatization is International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IFC provides investments and advice to the private sector in order to help 
it address global development issues.76 Depending on the contract type, the private company 
often must commit itself to investing money in the water privatization project. Often, only a 
small fraction of the total amount comes from the water provider and the rest comes from the 
IFC and other financial groups.77  
The First World countries that control the World Bank have a lot to gain from water 
companies gaining access to developing countries water resources. Most notably, when a 
developing country needs to privatize its water supply, it is almost always a company from the 
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developed world that receives the job. By forcing countries to choose between privatizing their 
water or get rejected for loans, they set up already well off countries to profit from developing 
country’s needs.78 While the World Bank's work is to alleviate poverty across the world, many of 
the policies they maintain do more to hurt the poor and help the rich. A report found that 99 
percent of the loans made throughout the 1990s called for full-cost recovery.79 As discussed in 
Chapter Two, full-cost recovery, without supporting measures, results in the price of water being 
too high a cost for the poor to afford. While water prices need to increase, they must do so in a 
way that takes into account the needs of the poor.  
 The ultimatum set up by the World Bank for poor countries of either privatizing their 
services or not receiving loans makes it appear as if the elite know better than the country’s own 
government. This leads to the discussion on why national governments privatize their water 
resources and what they have to gain and lose in the process of giving up their right and 
responsibility to provide their citizens with water. The government’s motive for privatization 
will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Water Privatization Companies (Veolia and Suez) 
 While the World Bank may support and promote water privatization projects, the group 
with the most influence on the structure and outcome of the project is the private water company 
that wins the bid to take over a country's water supply. For the purpose of understanding their 
role, we will look at the two largest private water companies, Veolia (previously called Vivendi) 
and Suez.  
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 In 1853, Compagnie Générale des Eaux (known as Vivendi) was created by Count Henri 
Siméon and gained its first service contract with the city of Lyons, France. This was just one of 
many private companies that were created during the time of Napoleon III when they were seen 
as more efficient and providing a better quality service than the government.80 This was 
especially important in 19th and 20th century, as more was understood about the importance of 
hygiene and health. A study of particular interest found that there was an increase in life 
expectancy of French women across three large cities from 1816 to 1905, which was largely 
credited to improved water and sanitation sources. This hygienic revolution continued to the 
point where in 1902, Paris was named the cleanest city in the world.81 
 While initially Vivendi only operated within France, in 1884 the company expanded 
beyond their borders and received their first international subsidy in Venice, Italy. This was the 
start of moving across Europe including other parts of Italy, Switzerland, Portugal and the 
Ottoman Empire.82 As time went on, and with improvements in water treatment, testing, and 
delivery, Vivendi was able to not only provide better services to the cities they were already 
working in but was able to expand its work. Jumping ahead to 1998, Vivendi set up 
“Waterforce” which is a team responsible for assisting countries and their water services after 
natural disasters. During the late 1990s into the 2000s Vivendi continued to expand its influence 
beyond France into other water markets.83 
 In the early 2000s, Vivendi self-destructed due to issues of corruption and bribery, which 
resulted in lawsuits, a plummeting stock value, and the firing of many of the corporate leaders. 
Most notable behind these corruption claims was the issue of money handling. Over time, the 
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corporation set aside 27 billion Francs from user fees to save for maintenance needs. This money 
was instead used to fund poor investments and took away from funds to refurbish old 
infrastructure.84 
  At the end of 2002, Vivendi Environment changed its name to Veolia Environment in 
order to separate itself from its negative past. During this time, Veolia chose to focus on 
contracts that required little investment on the company’s part but resulted in a consistent cash 
flow.85  Although the Vivendi went through a rough time, the current state is much stronger. 
Today, the renamed company Veolia is the leading provider of water and sanitation services with 
€12.6 billion in revenue and 103 million drinking water customers.86 It is important to note that 
the company is currently only working in four sub-Saharan African countries (Gabon, Namibia, 
Niger, and South Africa) and has found minimal success across the continent. As the global 
water situation gets worse, Veolia has positioned itself to be a force to control another attempt at 
water privatization as a means for development. 
 
 The history of Suez Environment goes back to 1858 when Ferdinand de Lessep formed 
the company “Compagnie universelle du canal de Suez” in order to build, and later run, the Suez 
Canal. In 1880 Société Lyonnaise des Eaux (Lyonnaise des Eaux) was setup to provide electric 
and water services to the people of France and abroad. The company continued providing water 
and sanitation services to France in addition to expanding to new global markets. In 1997, the 
two companies merged to create the joint “Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux”. Not long after in 2002, 
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Suez Environment was created as a way to group the water management, waste management, 
energy services.87 
 While the prevalence of water privatization has diminished since the late 1990s, Suez has 
positioned itself to be one of the main service providers as the debate over the best way to 
provide water to the millions that go without. While Suez is also involved in communication, 
waste management, and energy services, water has been the fastest growing.88 In 2011, Suez 
Environment made €14.8 billion (71 percent in Europe and six percent in Africa and the Middle 
East).89 Having only six percent of their revenue coming from Africa and the Middle East (and 
no projects in SSA) shows there is room for growth as the water crisis continues. At the same 
time, the untapped opportunity shows that there are major difficulties in providing water services 
to the region. Water is a precious resource that is unrivaled in satisfying human’s needs. Suez has 
positioned itself to ensure that if the globe reaches the tipping point where there is no choice but 
to return to the utilization of private resources they are one of the premiere service providers. 
 The role of the private water company is significant in the privatization process. During 
the planning stage, many governments are required to provide “financial guarantees” to the 
private company. These are put into place to reduce the risk of the company investing in an 
unstable project. Such guarantees include profit guarantees that ensure the company makes a 
profit no matter the outcome of service. Going further, most concessions are 20 to 30 years in 
length and are difficult and costly to cancel.90 From the view of the company these conditions 
make sense. Entering a foreign market with great needs is risky and initial investment costly. By 
putting these stipulations in place the company is better able to enter the partnership feeling like 
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they are safe while still having something to gain. From the standpoint of the national 
government and the citizens this just reaffirms the notion that the company is out to make a 
profit. 
 
National Governments 
 In the 19th century, water and sanitation services were originally supplied by private 
companies to the wealthy who had the means to afford such luxury. As the benefits of sanitary 
living conditions became more well-known, governments assumed the role of water and 
sanitation provision.91 While the government takeover of the service was successful in many 
developed countries, places without the capital and institutional resources to provide such a large 
service failed to reach their entire population. It was during the 1970s that the division between 
“statist”, those who believe it is that governments are best suited to address the needs of society, 
and “neoliberals”, those who think that society’s needs should be addressed by private 
organizations that are better able to provide needed services, became more pronounced and at 
odds.92 As discussed previously, the developed world’s push for neoliberal ideology had a great 
impact on the practices of the global South. 
 While it was discussed in Chapter Two, one of the main motives of government seeking 
private sector support is its own inability to efficiently and effectively provide the service. 
Beyond this, there are numerous reasons why the government looks to privatize its water 
services.  
One reason the government may want to privatize some services is to free up money for 
other sectors. By privatizing a resource, the country no longer has to spend public money to meet 
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the needs of sustaining the service. Instead, after privatization they can move the money to other 
neglected areas of society. In many developing countries, the available public funds are limited 
and cannot meet all of society's needs. 
 In addition to not being able to fully provide the service, another motive of the 
government to move forward with water privatization is the need for financial help from the 
World Bank. As discussed in the World Bank section, when governments find themselves in debt 
or in need of other financial help they often turn to the World Bank. While the government has to 
give up a large amount of control to a sector that they previously had a hundred percent control 
of, they have its debt written off and/or receive the loan they need. 
 The transition to privatization has the opportunity to provide a lot to national 
governments but at a steep cost. On one hand, the government is able to secure a needed service 
for the people. Even in the cases where privatization has ultimately been unsuccessful, the 
country is left with improved infrastructure. While service may be extended, governments often 
end up with angry citizens who feel they have been hurt by the provision of water services from 
a private supplier. This can impact politics and hurt leaders who are trying to balance the needs 
of the country and the people. 
 
Citizens 
 The most neglected group in the privatization process is also the most impacted by the 
transfer. Big organizations and the national governments have a say in the matter while the 
people who need the water, and struggle without it, rarely get a seat at the table. The citizens of 
the developing world suffer greatly from lack of sufficient and safe water. If privatization were 
the magic fix development organizations have been touting, citizens should be the group 
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advocating for its implementation the most. Instead, they have been vocal and vehemently 
against water privatization. Around the world people have spoken out, protested, and rioted 
against private companies entering their communities and taking over a vital resource.93 
 The most famous of these riots was in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 1999-2000. In 1999, two 
mandates set the stage for one of the greatest fights for water. First, the World Bank and the 
International Development Bank made privatization a stipulation for a loan to the community. 
Next, the government enacted Law 2029, which eliminated the guarantee of water to rural areas 
although it had been a custom for all of time.94 While for many this was seen as a major problem, 
it wasn't until the privatization began to be carried out that the people realized how disastrous 
this agreement was. The 40-year contract with Aguas del Tunari guaranteed a yearly 16 percent 
return on investment regardless of the quality of service provided. This guarantee resulted in 
water bills increasing by as much as 300 percent and resulted in people unable to pay their 
bills.95 
 In response to the private takeover of their water, the people banded together. The core 
leadership group was known as the Coordinadora and was made up of people who had stake in 
water supply and felt underrepresented.96 In early November of 1999, the Coordinadora began a 
demonstration that ended up including over ten-thousand people. These series of demonstrations 
continued through April of 2000 and mobilized over a hundred-thousand people. After many 
months of difficulty, the protests ended when the Coordinadora came to an agreement with the 
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government to terminate the contract with Aguas del Tunari and a service takeover by the 
municipal government with input from the Coordinadora.97 
 What this demonstration illustrates is the passion of the issue among the people. They 
were not happy with the water concession and new law and refused to go unheard. Their 
unrelenting pressure forced the government to change the laws and do what benefited the people. 
A less active, but very vocal, demonstration against privatization will be reviewed in the case 
study on Ghana. When people who already struggle to get by are forced to adapt to excessive 
price increases, their voices will be heard and the government will not be able to ignore them.  
 
Conclusion 
 The World Bank, private water company, national government, and the citizens all have 
different motives and needs when it comes water services and privatization. As would be 
expected, the groups with the greatest influence are the ones with the most monetary power 
(World Bank and Private Operator) whereas the groups with the greatest need are left to rely on 
the powerful (national government and citizens). While some groups may have more power, we 
will see in Chapter Four that the most successful privatization projects are the ones where all 
participating parties needs are considered and addressed.      
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Chapter Four: SSA Country Case Studies  
 
 In order to assess the viability of water privatization as a solution to the global water 
crisis, I have conducted three case studies of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The three 
countries selected were Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana. There were a few reasons as to why these 
countries were chosen to evaluate.  
First, one of the significant reasons these countries were chosen was because of the 
timeframe in which the water privatizations occurred. The privatization of water was emphasized 
by the World Bank throughout the 1990s. Guinea privatized its water resources from 1989 to 
2001. Senegal privatized its water sector in 1996 and is still benefitting from private sector 
participation. Finally, Ghana privatized its water sector from 2005 to 2011. While Ghana’s 
timeframe is outside of the original goal of looking at countries that privatized their water in the 
1990s, it became important to compare past projects to one that was implemented closer to the 
present day.  
Another reason for choosing these three countries was that they each had a unique 
characteristic that is important to highlight. In Guinea, the project was the first water 
privatization to receive support from the World Bank. This was significant because it served as 
the model for many future projects. In Senegal, the project was the only one studied that was 
very successful. This allowed for comparisons to be made to the less successful projects in 
Guinea and Ghana. Additionally, the innovative financial model and the strong working 
relationship between the government and the private operator were important aspects that could 
greatly influence future projects. Finally, the fact that Ghana privatized its water resources more 
recently served as a way to assess the current state of water privatization. Ghana also served to 
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illustrate the potential for the citizens of a country to organize against an unpopular reform 
project.         
The three countries also provided examples of three different contract types. Guinea 
utilized a lease contract. Senegal implemented an affermage contract (an alteration of a lease 
contract). Finally, Ghana used a management contract. The use of different models allowed for 
the opportunity to assess if one option is more effective than another type of contract.    
The three case studies presented provide many lessons on the water privatization process. 
With this information, it was possible to assess the future of the process, as well as evaluate 
whether it can be utilized as a tool for addressing the global water crisis.    
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Case One: Water Privatization in Guinea 
 
Water Sector Prior to Privatization 
 
 Geographically, Guinea’s capital city of Conakry is situated in a location where all of the 
community’s water needs should be easily satisfied. In addition to high levels of annual rainfall, 
the nearby Grandes Chutes reservoir has the potential to supply 500,000 m³/day, which would be 
more than enough to satisfy the needs of all of Conakry. This water source is an especially 
attractive supply option because it is located 233 meters above sea level, which allows for the 
system to be gravity fed and thus supplied at a lower cost.98 
 Prior to privatization, the water sector was weak with many management and structural 
problems. The sector was run by the public agency Enterprise Nationale de Distribution de l'Eau 
Guinéenne (DEG). Two of DEG's greatest issues were lack of documentation and consistent 
procedures. In 1985, a consultant was brought in to assess the current state of the water sector. 
The consultant’s report concluded that an audit could not be performed because there was limited 
documentation about the agency's financial performance. The agency was only able to stay in 
operation due to subsidies and revenue from government water usage.99 
 Along with financial issues, the sector was inefficient in its operations. The government 
had a policy that guaranteed a job to all university graduates. This resulted in DEG being greatly 
overstaffed with 504 employees (34 employees/1000 connections). In addition to excess 
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employees, the financial troubles of the country meant that workers across government sectors 
had low salaries that occasionally were not paid. This resulted in employees lacking the incentive 
to work efficiently and resulted in poor service.100  
 The problems of debt and inefficient performance were compounded by low water rates, 
lack of metering, and limited bill collection for water delivery. The water rate was GF 10/m³ 
($0.02/m³) until 1986 when it was increased to GF 60/m³ ($0.12/m³). This was significantly 
lower than the estimated marginal cost, which was perceived to be between $0.25 and $0.82.101 
Additionally, it was found that in 1984, only 5 percent of all connections were metered.102 The 
combination of low water rates, and inaccurate billing and collecting, resulted in a financially 
unstable sector. Another issue in the operation was the high number of illegal connections, and 
aging infrastructure, which resulted in a high level of unaccounted for water (UFW). This is 
water that escapes through leaks or illegal connections. The 1985 consultant’s report estimated 
that UFW was at least 60 percent.103 This is significant because UFW cannot be billed, and thus 
comes at a cost to the provider, but brings in no revenue. 
 The operational problems experienced by DEG resulted in poor service and quality of 
water. At the time of privatization, there were 13,300 legal connections and 40 standpipes (free 
standing pipe for public water access). Estimates put water coverage at 38 percent of the city 
population. The coverage was likely higher as this figure does not include those receiving water 
from illegal connections.104 Those without access to the water supply system were forced to rely 
on well water for their consumption. In 1992, 29 percent of Conakry solely used well water, and 
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50 percent used well water when piped service was interrupted. This is significant when coupled 
with the fact that 80 percent of Conakry utilized unimproved sanitation facilities, which resulted 
in polluted well water.105 This reliance on contaminated well water is important to note because 
of the increased risk for health problems associated with its consumption.  
     
Privatization Model    
 When the government decided to go through with privatization, many models were 
considered before opting for a lease contract. Under this scheme, the public sector was 
responsible for the infrastructure, and a company with a private majority was responsible for 
operating the sector.106 While many privatization projects have a great deal of private sector 
influence, it was less prevalent in Guinea because of government unrest and a weak judicial 
system that had a history of difficulty with enforcing private contracts.107 These conditions led to 
a situation where private sector participation was risky to the firms, and thus limited participation 
was secured. 
 The privatization was officially implemented in 1989. Due to the World Bank supporting 
the project, there were conditions that needed to be met with the setup of the privatization. First, 
the World Bank required that the private operator be selected through international bidding. 
Originally, there were six companies that submitted bids (SONEDE, TEAME, Lyonnaise des 
Eaux, SAUR, SAGER, and Vivendi). After this initial process, two companies dropped out, and 
the other four formed two consortia. The winning group was SAUR and Vivendi whose bid was 
30 percent below the cost estimated by consultants.108 
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 In order to carry out the public-private partnership, two enterprises were formed. The first 
was the public Société Nationale des Eaux de Guinée (SONEG). The second firm was the public-
private Société d'Exploitation des Eaux de Guinée (SEEG). SONEG and SEEG worked together 
under a 10 year lease contract. Under this type of contract, the private operator (SEEG) is 
responsible for the day to day operations and receives all bill payment from consumers. The 
operator then pays a lease fee to the public asset holder (SONEG), and keeps the rest of the 
revenue as payment for its work.  
SONEG was completely owned by the government, and reported to a board of directors, 
and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy. There was a contract between SONEG and 
the government. In this contract, there were conditions on water rates, a requirement that the 
government pay all bills, and defined targets for the reform.109 Under the terms of the lease 
contract with SEEG, SONEG owned all assets, was responsible for planning and implementing 
new investments, paying off all sector debt, and setting water rates.110   
SEEG was jointly owned by the government of Guinea (49 percent) and the consortia of 
SAUR and Vivendi (51 percent). Under the lease contract, SEEG was responsible for the 
operational aspects of the water sector, including distribution, collection, and small-scale 
infrastructure. For their contribution, the government provided equipment and infrastructure. 
SAUR and Vivendi provided 51 percent of the startup funds which totaled US $3 million.111 A 
detailed breakdown of the contracts and responsibilities of each party can be found listed as 
Chart Two in the Appendix.  
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Financing Privatization  
 The World Bank had been active in Guinea’s water sector long before the privatization 
process began. The first major project was the Conakry Water Supply and Sanitation Project 
(WSP-1), which ran from April 1979 to December 1985, and provided US $21.874 million for 
sector improvements. The goals of the project were, “aimed primarily at establishing Entreprise 
Nationale de Distribution d'Eau de Guinee (DEG) as a viable organization, at restoring a 
satisfactory water supply level of service and at providing appropriate sanitation to most of 
Conakry's population.”112 While some of the structural issues were improved, the management 
and institutional problems persisted. A lesson learned from the WSP-I, was that sector 
improvements would only come with, “a radical reshaping of institutional responsibilities, 
preferably through a degree of privatization.”113   
With this lesson learned, the World Bank implemented the Second Water Supply Project 
(WSP-II) in 1989. This occurred simultaneously to the privatization of the water sector. The 
motivation for the WSP-II was that the goals of WSP-I were not fully achieved, and this would 
be the second attempt at World Bank support for the sector. The World Bank cited that the WSP-
II, "was structured with the main goal of creating a legal, institutional, technical, and financial 
framework that would constitute a sound basis for further sector development.”114 The project 
provided US $105.6 million to fund new investment, as well as rehab existing infrastructure. 115 
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This was a significant undertaking because it was the first World Bank project, “to 
support private sector participation (PSP) in the delivery of urban water services.”116 Being the 
first PSP project is important because it serves as a model for all future projects.  
 
Changes After Privatization 
 
 After the water sector was reformed, there were improvements, although not as 
significant as expected during the planning process. Looking at the numerous facets of water 
delivery allows one to see where structural issues may have hindered improvements.     
One of the greatest areas of advancement following reform was the increased investment 
in the sector. The primary funding for investments came from the World Bank through the 
previously discussed Second Water Supply Project.  Had the sector continued to operate under 
DEG, there would have been no outside donor support, and the upgrades to the sector would 
have never happened. This project also resulted in the construction of a new treatment plant, and 
made the pipeline from Grande Chutes a reality. The new pipeline increased the potential water 
production from 54,000 m³/day in 1988 to 100,000 m³/day in 1993.117  
While there was an increase in the number of connections in Conakry, the increase was 
less than expected. Coverage improved from 38 percent to 47 percent. There are two main 
factors cited as for why coverage improved so minimally. First, the cost to connect to the sector 
was so high that many citizens could not afford the investment. Second, the contractual 
relationship between SONEG and SEEG was constructed in such a way that many 
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responsibilities seemed to overlap, and resulted in disagreements about who was responsible for 
connections.118       
 An important factor in water sector development is the quality of the drinking water. This 
is also an area where improvements are hard to assess, as there are no records of measuring the 
water quality prior to reform. Even without statistical data, improvements after reform were 
evident in that piped water passed the standards needed for use by the local Coca-Cola bottling 
plant. Additionally, a 1994 study found that the chemicals and bacteria found within Conakry’s 
drinking water met the standards of the World Health Organization (WHO).119  
 In order for the sector to be financially stable, there had to be a system of metering in 
order to know how much water was being consumed. Prior to privatization, this was one of the 
weakest areas of the sector with only five percent of consumers having a working meter. In 1996, 
98 percent of private and 100 percent of government connections had working meters.120 
Metering is ineffective if there is not a system in place to bill users and collect on water metered. 
This area improved, but continued to struggle following reform. At the beginning of the 
privatization process, private consumer collection was 75 percent, but fell to 50 percent in 1991-
1992, before settling at 60 percent in 1996.121 Civil servants and deputies had previously had 
unbilled private connections, but this practice was ended. Additionally, payment for water used 
by the government had been sporadic. At the beginning of the privatization process, the 
government paid their water bills regularly. In 1991, the government collection rate fell to 50 
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percent, and then fell further to 10 percent in 1993. This low level of compliance was addressed 
and by 1996 the government payment was 80 percent.122 
An area that plagues many public utilities is inefficiency due to excess employees. As 
stated previously, prior to reform DEG had 504 employees. After reform, SEEG employed 312 
workers, and SONEG had 43 workers. These cuts made the sector more productive. The two 
measures used to assess productivity are connections per worker and output per worker. After 
reform, both improved but had different outcomes in the long run. Connections per worker 
increased after reform, only to drop between 1994 and 1996 before increasing again. Output per 
worker continuously increased after reform. It is believed that the differences can be attributed to 
the fact that after reform revenue from water sales increased slowly whereas revenue from 
construction increased rapidly.123      
 One of the main motives for privatization was DEG’s poor finances. After privatization, 
there were strong financial improvements, which would be expected given the large increase in 
metering, billing, and collection. SEEG became and remained profitable posting GF 3.2 billion 
in profits in 1996.124 While SEEG was financially strong, SONEG had mixed results. One of the 
areas of improvement was that, “SONEG’s total revenues grew significantly, going from GNF 
624 million in 1990 to GNF 6,026 million in 1995.”125 While revenues increased, SONEG’s 
profits were negative, which was, “due to the sharp drop in the ‘rental fee’ that SEEG paid 
SONEG and the end of the subsidy that the government paid SONEG for debt service.”126 This 
was not surprising as most of SONEG’s funding came from donors, rather than from within the 
                                                
122 Ménard, Clarke, Zuluaga pp. 13 
123 Ibid., p. 20 
124 Ménard and Clarke, p. 32 
125 Republic of Guinea Second Water Supply Project Implementation Completion Report, p. 4 
126 Ménard, Clarke, Zuluaga pp. 19 
 
 
50 
sector, and because there was a great need for a large amount of spending due to needed 
infrastructure. This will be more of an issue when donor funding is not available.127    
The most controversial change was the increase in water prices. As discussed previously, 
initial rates were too low to support the needs of the sector. At the same time, increasing prices to 
a level of full cost recovery would be heavily felt by the people. The solution was to implement a 
government subsidy that would slowly diminish over a six year period. At the time of reform, 
prices increased from GF 60/m³ ($0.12/m³) to 150 FG/m³ (US $0.25/m³), which was enough to 
cover SEEG and SONEG’s daily costs.128 In 1996, at the end of the government subsidy, prices 
were expected to be 660 GNF/m³ but instead had increased to 880 GNF/m³.129130  
Another important factor was that the cost to get connected to the system was 90,000 FG 
(roughly US $90). This was very high even for wealthier citizens.131 As the intended goal of 
privatization should be to improve water delivery and increase connections, the high cost of both 
delivery and connection was alarming. If the wealthiest cannot make the investment in a piped 
water connection then the urban poor have no chance of gaining access to the system.      
Another issue was the setup of the relationship between SONEG and SEEG. Both 
SONEG and SEEG were responsible for varying levels and types of investment, but differing 
priorities have led to disputes. The main issue was that, “Because SONEG [tended] to be more 
concerned with social and political goals, while SEEG [had] commercial goals, they often 
[disagreed] on priorities concerning network expansion.”132 Examples of social and political 
goals include focusing on how decisions impact the poor, and catering to a certain group of 
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voters. Commercial goals are associated with the cost of providing a service and a company’s 
bottom line.  With these different motives, the two companies have had difficulty working 
together. With more distinct roles, and a clearer breakdown in responsibility, there would have 
been fewer disagreements and delays.     
When disputes did occur, there was no clear protocol for filing complaints. The varying 
responsibilities meant that one party could use its power to retaliate against the actions of the 
other party. When a natural monopoly, such as water resources are privatized, most often a 
regulator is in place to ensure that the firm doesn’t overextend its monopoly power.133 In Guinea, 
there was no regulator and thus disputes could not be settled. One of the lessons of this 
privatization was that there must be, “an independent body that can enforce the contract and 
prevent the government from taking retaliatory action”134 The contract setup was supposed to 
address this issue. With the government owning 49 percent of SEEG, it was believed that there 
would be a common voice between SONEG and SEEG, but instead this just resulted in more 
disagreements.135  
Another issue was the continued high level of UFW. In 1996, UFW was 48 percent. 
There are a few reasons for this high percentage. First, even after reform, there were a high 
number of illegal connections to the system. Also, in places where infrastructure has not been 
improved, there is a greater chance for broken pipes and leaks. While a high level of UFW 
illustrates that the sector has room for improvement, little was done to address the problem. This 
can be traced back to the contract between SONEG and SEEG. SEEG paid a rental fee for the 
right to run the sector. This fee was negotiated based on revenue from collection not the amount 
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of water delivered. There was little incentive to reduce the wasted water because it did not 
impact the company financially.136 This goes back to the motives of the companies and 
privatization schemes as a whole. A company motivated by finances will disregard issue of 
social and environmental concern as long as their bottom line does not suffer.  
 Touched upon early was the issue of the government not paying its bills. The lack of 
payment from the government was significant because it made up 30 percent of total sales. This 
greatly impacted the ability of the private firm to fund their operations. This lack of payment 
meant higher prices had to be passed on to the rest of the consumers to cover costs.137 While 
SEEG had the contractual right to cut off anyone who does not pay their bills for three 
consecutive months, they continued to supply the government with water. This is because SEEG 
needed the government. The interrelated nature of SONEG and SEEG means that the 
government had great control over the decisions made and thus has some level of power over 
SEEG’s decision making.138     
 
Water Sector Today    
 
 The overall results of the water privatization in Guinea were positive, but issues in the 
format of the contract between SONEG and SEEG, as well as supply issues, hurt the overall 
success of program. Additionally, while there were upgrades across the water sector, these 
improvements came at an unacceptably high cost to the consumers. 
What cannot be denied is that significant investment from the World Bank, and other 
development organizations, greatly improved the infrastructure and subsequently the delivery of 
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water services in the city. While the initial results were mostly positive, over time the 
relationship between the government and private operator broke down. There was an attempt to 
extend the contract, but disagreements over changes in the expectations for each party caused the 
negotiations to fail. In 2001, SAUR and Vivendi sold their shares of SEEG and the sector 
reverted to complete government control. The government merged SONEG and SEEG into the 
Société des Eaux de Guinée (SEG).  
After the privatization ended, the sector began to experience problems. Interrupted water 
supply has become common and the sector is financially unstable and close to bankrupt. Finally, 
as seen prior to privatization, the rapid urbanization in Conakry has caused the percentage of the 
population with access to a piped connection to decrease from 31 percent in 1990 to 28 percent 
in 2004.139 This case shows that privatization can have a great influence on water services but 
that these improvements will not be sustainable if the cost to consumers greatly increases. 
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Case Two: Water Privatization in Senegal 
 
 
Water Sector Prior to Privatization 
 
Unlike Guinea, the Republic of Senegal is much drier and does not have as abundant a 
level of rainfall or lie on a plentiful aqueduct. The major sources of water are the Senegal and 
Gambia Rivers, but the water levels have been dropping annually. While some regions do have 
access to sufficient groundwater, over utilization has resulted in increased salinization, and an 
inability to use the resource. Water wells are often used in urban areas, but the lack of adequate 
sanitation means some wells have been contaminated, resulting in people drinking unsafe 
water.140   
With these issues, it was clear something needed to change in order to provide the urban 
citizens of Senegal with clean and plentiful water. Privatization of water resources was not a new 
concept in Senegal when reform occurred in 1995. When Senegal gained independence from 
France in 1960, the country’s urban water was controlled by Générale des Eaux (Vivendi). This 
private sector control continued until 1971 when the government nationalized the sector.141   
 During the 1970s and 1980s, the sector experienced numerous issues both in terms of 
management and delivery. It was decided in 1983 to form a public utility, Société Nationale 
d’Exploitation des Eaux du Sénégal (SONEES), which would be responsible for running the 
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sector.142 Under a public utility, the government contracts out the service to a business that 
provides everyday necessities, and is subject to government regulation. The need for government 
regulation is that most public utilities hold monopoly power over the good they are providing.143 
It was hoped that the creation of SONEES, guided by business principles, would help improve 
water production and deliver in the country.  
SONEES was responsible for service deliver to the capital city of Dakar, and 41 other 
towns that all had populations over 5,000 people. This accounted for roughly 90 percent of the 
total urban population of Senegal.144 Prior to privatization, less than 56 percent of the 2.4 million 
people living in the Dakar metropolitan area had access to water from SONEES. Those with 
water connections were not guaranteed access for a full 24 hours a day.145 In fact, due to a 
shortage of 82,000 m³/day, water was only supplied for 16 hours a day on average. Pair this with 
27 percent of water produced being lost through theft or leakage, and the sector was clearly in 
need of reform.146 
While contracting the service to a public utility did improve some aspects of the sector, 
there were still numerous management issues that limited SONEES. The government’s decision 
to heavily regulate SONEES’s activities meant that the company was limited in its ability to 
provide the service to all those in need. This lack of sovereignty meant that SONEES couldn’t 
set water rates, plan improvements, or push public agencies to pay their bills without input from 
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the government.147 It was this need for independence, as well as water delivery problems, which 
illustrated the need for reform.   
 
Privatization Model  
 When it was decided that the sector would be privatized, a committee was created to 
complete evaluations of past water privatization schemes, in order to assess the best option for 
Senegal’s needs. The committee was made up of the offices of the President, Prime Minister, and 
officials with some connection to water resources in the country.148 This is a key component of 
Senegal’s privatization process because the officials were attempting to learn everything about 
the process and potential pitfalls prior to their own implementation.  
Guided by recommendations from the committee, SONEES was broken up. In its place, a 
State Asset Holding Company, Société Nationale des Eaux du Sénégal (SONES), was created to 
serve as the owner of the sector assets as well as to plan and implement all large investments. 
Additionally, a private operating company, Sénégelaise des Eaux (SDE), was formed to run the 
daily operations. SDE was owned by numerous parties including the majority owning French, 
private company SAUR which won the international bidding process with a proposed supply rate 
of 236 CFA per cubic meter. Ownership of SDE was broken up with SAUR owning 57.84 
percent, Senegalese investors 32.16 percent, the State five percent, and former SONEES staff 
five percent.149 
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By creating a State Asset Holding Company, the government was able to show the people 
that they were not simply handing over the sector to private ownership, but rather that they were 
being active participants in the process. Additionally, the responsibilities of the State Asset 
Holding Company, and the private company, were clearly defined which was deemed important 
to ensure there were no arguments over duties once the project began. 
 Contracts were set to ensure that all interactions between the different parties went 
smoothly. SONES signed a 30 year concession contract, and a sector development contract, 
which outlined investment responsibilities. SDE signed a performance contract with SONES, 
outlining each firm’s responsibilities, and provided incentives for demonstrated improvements. 
Finally, the two firms and the Republic of Senegal all signed a 10 year affermage contract which 
will be discussed below.150 A table illustrating the contracts and relationships between the 
different groups can be found in the appendix labeled as Chart Three.    
Under the chosen affermage contract the asset holder takes on all investment 
responsibility and, “the private operator is responsible for collecting the water user fees from the 
individual customers and will retain for itself an amount specified in the contract which generally 
covers its operating costs and agreed upon profit”.151 Like in Guinea, the private operator is 
responsible for managing the sector and is paid for this service. The difference between the lease 
contract in Guinea, and the affermage contract in Senegal, is the level of risk taken on by the 
private operator. Under a lease contract, the amount paid to the asset holder is set, and the private 
operator holds the risk depending on how much revenue is produced. Under an affermage 
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contract, the private operator is guaranteed the agreed upon fee, and it is the asset holder who 
takes on the risk for the amount of revenue produced.152     
In addition to the issue of risk, there are a few reasons as to why this type of contract 
would be chosen. First, the asset holder has complete control of the rate structure which ensures 
that citizens are not being overcharged solely for the benefit of the private operator. Also, an 
affermage contract is especially appealing because limited outside regulation is needed in order 
to sustain the project. Much of the needed regulation comes from the guidelines within the 
contract.153 This is significant because it allows for each party to achieve its own expectations 
without much interference. On the other hand, it could result in future issues regarding who to 
address with complaints. Finally, an affermage contract does not require large scale investment 
from a private operator. The government had no need for extra investment, as they had already 
secured enough from donors and done so at a lower cost than would have been possible from the 
private sector.154  
Along with the affermage contract, there was also a performance contract. In addition to 
the normal payment set up under the affermage contract, a formula was created to include 
incentives for SDE. First, there was the measure of technical efficiency which was used to help 
reduce UFW to 15 percent within five years. The second incentive was to improve bill collection 
to 97 percent by year three.155 This was important because it gave the private operator incentive 
to improve two of the greatest problems plaguing the sector. Without these incentives, SDE 
would be paid their guaranteed fee regardless of whether or not there were improvements in the 
water sector.    
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 One of the main goals of the project was to achieve long-term financial stability. This 
was to be achieved through the use of an intricate financial model. The model was created by 
Ernst and Young with help from the World Bank. With the model, the parties involved could test 
out different scenarios and assess the viability of financial equilibrium being achieved. After 
numerous attempts, a scenario was found that would achieve equilibrium in 2003 given that the, 
“World Bank-financed investment project went ahead, network efficiency was improved, and 
consumer tariffs for water supply were increased at a rate of no more than 3 percent per year.”156   
 Even with strong planning, and clearly defined contracts, the privatization would not 
have been possible without the funds from the World Bank and other development agencies. 
Below is an outline of the support provided for this project.    
 
Financing Privatization 
 Without support from outside donors, reform would not have been possible. Originally, 
the World Bank planned to provide funding to increase the amount of water that could be 
delivered to Dakar from the Ngnith plant, but that was seen as pointless with UFW still being 
high. With that in mind, the Bank provided funding through the World Bank Water Sector 
Project for improvements to both the plant as well as the overall operations of the sector.157 
 The International Development Association (IDA), which is the branch of the World 
Bank that assists developing countries with loans, was the major donor for this project. It 
provided US $85 million to SONES of which 45 percent was a loan with the remaining 55 
percent as equity. An additional US $15 million was provided to the Ministry of Hydraulics.158 
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The other donors to the project were SONES, The French Fund for Development (CFD), the 
state of Germany, the Action Group for Community Development (AGCD), the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the Nordic Development Fund (NDF), the West African Development 
Bank (BOAD), and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA).159  
 The goals of the World Bank project were to improve sustainability, address poverty and 
health issues, and to involve the private sector in the country’s urban water supply.160 This would 
be achieved through using the provided funds to rehab existing infrastructure, expand the sector 
to underserved urban areas, and improve the management of the sector. It was estimated that 
improvements from this project would benefit 1.8 million people.161 
 In addition to support from the donor community, the project relied on other financial 
opportunities to reach the level of funding needed. Using the previously discussed financial 
model, it was found that there would be a cash shortfall of US $21 million in 1998 due to 
planned construction. In order to overcome this issue, three different options were combined. 
First, SDE had to purchase all operating equipment from SONES. Second, a portion of the 
financing was structured as equity. This gave investors part-ownership within the sector and 
meant that the government wouldn’t have to pay any debt on the funds as they would have to if 
the funds were structured as a loan. Finally, SONES received a line of credit from Citibank and 
Compagnie Bancaire de l’Afrique (CBAO). The ability to attract banks to contribute a line of 
credit was not only seen as innovative, but it signified that the government, private operator, and 
project as a whole were trusted and expected to be successful.162         
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Changes After Privatization 
 With most water privatization projects, the increase in water rates is the most contentious 
issue. In Senegal, the price of water prior to privatization covered all maintenance and operations 
costs, but didn’t allow for the needed investment to expand the sector. Rather than raising rates 
for all individuals equally, a system was enacted to form an increasing block tariff. Under this 
setup, there is a “social tariff” for those consuming under 20 m³/60 days, a “dissuasive tariff” for 
using more than 100m³/60 days, and then a normal tariff for consumption between these two 
levels. The reason for this approach is that it will create a cross-subsidy where, “consumption in 
the higher blocks will generate enough surplus to finance the subsidy delivered to customers 
consuming water in the lowest ‘lifeline’ block...”163  
 Prior to privatization, there were two large price hikes: one in 1992 and another in 1994. 
Since 1996, when privatization was implemented, the nominal rates have increased at an average 
annual rate of 3.5 percent, but only 2.1 percent when viewed in real terms.164 These increases 
were low in part because the water rates charged prior to privatization already covered the day to 
day costs of the sector. Additionally, the low increase in water rates reflected the strong planning 
prior to privatization, and the government's reliance on the financial model for justifying any 
changes in the water rates. While it was important to keep consumer prices relatively close to the 
rates charged prior to privatization, there is some concern about the future of the sector. If the 
revenue brought in only covers operational and delivery costs, Senegal will continue to need to 
rely on the donor community for funding for future investments.165 While the donor community 
has been extremely helpful up to this point, the government and the water sector should not 
become reliant on it because there is no guarantee it will always be provided.  
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 Even with only slight price increases, there must be improvements in numerous other 
areas for the privatization to be deemed beneficial to the consumers. One area is the quantity of 
water available to consumers. Due to the improvements from privatization, the water supply 
increased by 18 percent from 264,000 m³/day to 312,000 m³/day between 1996 and 2003.166 
During this period, 81,000 households were connected to the sector, and 400 standpipes were 
constructed.167 The greatest reason for this increased availability was the construction of the 
Ngnith plant, located on Lac de Guiers (Lake Guiers), and the 150 kilometer pipeline connecting 
it to Dakar.168  
  Another area that is often a negative outcome of privatization is the impact on workers. 
Often public utilities are overstaffed, and a private company comes in and cuts employees for the 
sake of efficiency. A study found that employment by SDE and SONES did decline but that the 
losses were, “not accomplished by lay-offs but by natural attrition”.169 Those who were still 
employed found that payment increased after privatization, but at a much smaller rate than prior 
to reform. Prior to reform, wages and benefits were increasing at 20.5 percent (15.3 percent in 
real terms). After reform, wages and benefits increased by 4.8 percent (3.3 percent in real 
terms).170 A reason for the relatively good outcome for employees was twofold. First, the 
original public utility SONEES was not greatly overstaffed prior to privatization, which was rare. 
Second, part of the planning stage included a clause that all former SONEES staff be retained in 
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some capacity after reform took place.171 While the overall benefits to employees have been 
positive, there still have been some issues that have yet to be resolved. Most notably, the 
stipulation that all SONEES employees had to be retained in fact caused some frustration. Those 
employees who did not receive jobs working for SDE, but instead gained employment with 
SONES, are making less money but responsible for overseeing their co-workers. At times this 
has resulted in difficulty working together, but overall, has not impacted the work of the 
sector.172   
A unique aspect of this privatization project was the targets given to the private operator. 
The first target was to improve technical efficiency from 73 percent to 85 percent. This ended up 
being extremely challenging because the initial 73 percent baseline was significantly 
overestimated with the actual figure being much lower. SDE was not able to reach their goal and 
still had not reached 80 percent by the 2002 target.173 The second target of bill collection has 
been much more successful with SDE meeting, and sustaining, the 97 percent target since 
1999.174 The private operator is compensated financially for meeting these objectives. It is paid 
the bid price for the water delivered and then either rewarded with a higher price based on 
achieved objectives or a reduced price for underperforming.175   
 With the implementation of privatization, there were financial improvements for both the 
public and private sectors. In the public sector, from 1996 to 2000 SONES recorded losses, but 
since 2000 those losses have been reduced. Additionally, the cash balance of the public utility 
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has been positive since 1996.176 SDE also performed well. After initial issues in the first few 
years of service, SDE has recorded profits since 1999.177    
 It is important to point out there was potentially a major problem with the project that 
was averted through cooperation and negotiations. As previously stated, the technical efficiency 
starting point was overestimated. This made achieving the target even more difficult, and hurt 
SDE financially. This issue was resolved when in 1998 SONES and SDE came together and 
were able to renegotiate the targets. This in effect reduced the base year figure and subsequent 
targets. For payment, SDE is paid their base figure and then the either earn or are fined based on 
whether or not it meets the targets. Due to incorrect targets, SDE was wrongfully fined and this 
hurt their financial performance. When the targets were re-negotiated, SDE went from recording 
losses to continued profit. 178    
 The fact that the two parties could come to these recalculations and settle all monetary 
issues without hostility or the need of outside regulators is extremely important for future 
projects. All too often, when times get tough parties that should be working towards the same 
goal fracture and divide. This project shows that is possible for a company to put its personal 
interests aside, and work towards the greater goal of the project. This is possible while still 
making good business decisions.  
 
Addressing the Needs of the Poor 
 A major concern of people opposed to private sector participation is that it 
disproportionately hurts the poor. The poor often cannot afford the increase in price, both in 
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terms of delivery and connection costs. The privatization scheme in Senegal made a direct effort 
to address the needs of the poorest citizens.  
 The government has come up with three ways to address the water needs of the poor. 
First, as discussed in the section of water tariffs, they have created a “social tariff” which 
delivers water at a reduced cost to those consuming small amounts of water. The second policy 
subsidizes the cost of connecting to the water system through a “social connection program”. 
Finally, the government has built standpipes in areas of higher poverty that supply water at a 
lower rate (although not as low as if they had access to their own pipe).179 The government has 
shown an understanding of the special challenges the poor face, and the need to create policies 
that take into account their financial situation. A major factor in the success of these initiatives 
was the contract format that pays SDE their fee based on water distributed. This means there was 
no disincentive to provide water to the poor.180   
The criticism of these policies focuses on the social connection program. The policy in 
fact ensures that the poorest, and greatest in need, cannot gain access to this program. To be 
eligible for a reduced rate connection someone must, “have title to the land, and an existing 
house must be located on it.”181 The poorest of the poor do may not be able to meet these needs 
and thus are ineligible. A reduction in the requirements would allow for the policy to reach more 
people and especially those who could benefit the most from the program. 
 
Water Sector Today 
 The World Bank Water Sector Project was scheduled to close on June 30, 2001 but was 
extended twice, and eventually ended on June 30, 2004. The major reason for this delay was that 
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the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Senegalese CFA changed between the planning 
and implementation phases, which resulted in savings that could be utilized.182 While the World 
Bank funding came to an end, the privatization has continued and has been one of the most 
successful projects of its kind. The format of this scheme has been carried out in other countries 
and has served as a model for the best way to carry out the implementation of private sector 
involvement in a country's water sector.  The results have continued as 76 percent of urban 
households now have access to water which is the highest level in all of SSA.183 If there is a 
return to an emphasis on water privatization for addressing global water issues, Senegal serves as 
a strong model for duplication.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
182 Implementation Completion Report on a Credit in the Amount of SDR 63.5 Million to the Republic of Senegal for 
a Water Sector Project, p. 13 
183 Sanitation and Water Supply. Rep. International Development Association, n.d. 5. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/IDA-Sanitation-WaterSupply.pdf>. 
 
 
67 
 
Case Three: Water Privatization in Ghana 
 
Water Sector Prior to Privatization  
Ghana was the first country in SSA to gain independence in 1957. After independence, 
the Ministry of Works and Housing (MWH) created a Water Supply Division in order to provide 
water to both the rural and urban populations across the country. This existed until 1965 when 
the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) was created in order to meet the water and 
sanitation needs of the country.184 The hope was that by creating a business to run the water 
supply sector, operations would become more efficient and service would improve. In reality, 
GWSC had a difficult time delivering the service, and there were many issues with the sector. 
From 1970 to 1990, “one-third of the facilities had broken down and the rest operated below 
design capacity.”185 Additionally, between 1992 and 2002, urban water coverage dropped from 
76 percent to 59 percent while UFW stood at 50 percent.186 These negative results signaled the 
need for sector reform.    
GWSC continued to be the sole provider of water until 1994 when rural and urban water 
supply was separated as suggested by the World Bank. In its place, two new companies were 
created. The Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) was responsible for rural water 
supply, and Ghana Water Company Ltd (GWCL) was created to meet urban water needs.187 The 
World Bank knew that there was a great economic incentive to have the urban water supply 
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separated from the rural sector.188 By separating the two, the potentially profitable urban sector 
would be independent of the unprofitable rural sector. It was after this decision was made that 
the push to privatize the urban water supply began. In February of 1995, a group of consultants 
were brought in to plan out the best option for the sector. It was determined that a lease contract 
would be the best avenue for reform.189 Under this contract type, the private operator would have 
been responsible for, “providing the water supply, rehabilitating and renewing pipes, maintaining 
assets, billing and collecting tariffs, and expanding service coverage.”190  
In 1997, the Government of Ghana created the Public Utility Regulatory Commission 
(PURC), “to ensure appropriate regulation in the water and electricity sectors.”191 While 
regulation is vital, especially when dealing with a natural monopoly such as water, the 
commission’s autonomy was weak as there was great pressure from the World Bank and IMF. 
The IMF pushed for PURC to prepare the sector to operate at a level of full cost recovery. This 
was done through the creation of an “automatic tariff adjustment mechanism” which would 
automatically change water rates based on shifts in Ghana’s currency. Due to the fact that 
Ghana’s currency depreciated far more than it appreciated, this meant prices were expected to 
continuously increase.192   
 After the consultant’s proposals were presented in 1995, it took until 1998 to complete 
the project outline, and prepare for bids to be called. It was during this time that opposition from 
within the country began to grow. In 1999, the Ministry of Housing and Works moved forward 
with plans to work with the private United States company, Azurix, as the private operator. The 
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two losing water giants, Suez and Vivendi, believed the process to pick the operator had been 
corrupt and the project was eventually cancelled after legitimate concern over Azurix having 
provided US $5 million in bribes to Ghanaian politicians.193   
With another failed attempt at privatization, the public opposition to the proposal grew 
more vocal. While individually many people had been upset since the initial privatization 
attempts, it was not until 2001 when groups from across Ghanaian society came together and 
formed the Ghana National Coalition Against the Privatization of Water (National CAP of 
Water). The group’s goal was to, “defend water as a public good and a human right, to build 
public awareness of the water privatization proposal, and to mobilize a broad cross-section of 
society to oppose the privatization of water.”194 
 The group was greatly successful in bringing both national and international attention to 
the privatization proposal in Ghana. There were a few reasons as to why they found success. 
First, due to rapid urbanization, the percentage of the urban population with access to an 
adequate water source has decreased over the past twenty years. While one would expect these 
declines to lead to increased spending in order to address the deficiency, the opposite was in fact 
true. Debt owed to the IMF and World Bank meant that the government had to decrease their 
spending and thus the lack of urban water access only increased.195 The country’s poor financial 
performance led to sector investments dropping as low as US $1.50 per capita per year.196 
Another reason the group was successful was that even though access was decreasing, the 
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prospect of privatization led to increased prices. As part of the country's loan conditions, the 
government was required to increase the water rates by 95 percent in order to move towards full 
cost recovery.197 Decreased access, coupled with unaffordable prices, led to an overall distrust of 
the World Bank/IMF and anger over the decision to move forward with water privatization. 
 The National CAP of Water's ability to bring together people from across society, as well 
as experts from around the world, resulted in a brief victory. In 2003, the government announced 
that they would be suspending the privatization as the public opposition, as well as changes in 
the terms of the project, made the project undesirable.198 While the victory was short lived, and 
privatization eventually moved forward, this story of public opposition illustrates an important 
lesson for future projects. Strong public opposition makes governments wary of implementing 
projects due to the potential political fallout as well as negative international attention. 
Governments and the World Bank would be well advised to consult public groups about their 
needs prior to embarking on a large scale project.  
After this brief cancellation, the next attempt at privatization was in 2004 and success 
was vital. At the time, the population of Ghana stood at 20 million people, and it was estimated 
that 10.3 million, or 51 percent, had access to an improved water source. Additionally, of the 8.4 
million citizens who live in urban areas, only 61 percent had access to improved water. 199 An 
improved water source is defined as being, “protected from outside contamination, in particular 
from contamination with faecal matter.”200 A level of 61 percent coverage is low but especially 
                                                
197 McDonald and Ruiters, p. 281 
198 Ibid., p. 286 
199 Project Appraisal Document on the Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 71 Million to the Republic of Ghana 
for an Urban Water Project. Rep. no. 28557-GH. The World Bank, 1 July 2004. 1. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
<http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/07/12/000090341_20040712101848/Rend
ered/PDF/285570GH.pdf>. 
200 "Introduction."  
 
 
71 
worrisome because urban water coverage stood at 70 percent in 2001 and even higher at 76 
percent in 1992.201 The growing population without access to an adequate water source was 
negatively impacted in numerous ways. Most notably, UNICEF found that in 2003, 70 percent of 
all disease in Ghana was related to lack of adequate water and sanitation.202 As time went on, the 
water sector was getting worse, and there seemed to be no other viable solution than to finally 
privatize the sector.  
 
Privatization Model  
It was during the 2004 attempt at privatization that headway was finally achieved. While 
previous attempts had suggested a lease contract, it was eventually decided on a five year 
management contract to cover 80 urban areas. The lease contract option was deemed undesirable 
by private operators because of the high level of investment that they would be responsible to 
supply.203 The greatest change with the move from a lease to a management contract was that 
outside investment went from the original proposal of US $140 million fell to zero with all 
investment coming from the public asset holder through the World Bank.204 
Under the management contract, the private operator was responsible for operating the 
sector and achieving goals laid out in the contract but was not required to provide financial 
investments.205 In return for successful operation, the operator would be paid by the World Bank 
for the first four years. During the final year, payment would come 75 percent from the World 
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Bank and 25 percent from funds derived from the improved sector.206 With all capital coming 
from the World Bank, rather than the private sector, the contract allowed for the private company 
to make money with limited risk. As long as it met the specified goals, the operator would be 
meeting its end of the contract. 
When it was decided to go ahead with a management contract, a private company had to 
be selected to run the sector. The operator selected was a consortium of Vitens Evides 
International and Rand Water. Vitens Evides International is composed of the two largest water 
companies (Vitens and Evides) in the Netherlands and has a stated mission of supplying the, 
“increasing number of people in developing countries with sustainable access to safe and reliable 
drinking water services.”207 This is important to note because they are the only water company 
involved in any of the three case studies that has a social mission that sees their goal as helping 
the people of the developing countries who need water services. The other private operators all 
understood they were helping expand a country's water services, but treated their jobs as business 
first. Rand Water is a South African company that is the largest bulk water provider in Africa.208 
It is the only African company that was utilized in the countries presented in the three case 
studies. The two companies came together and formed Aqua Vitens Rand Limited (AVRL). 
 
Financing Privatization 
 The renewed attempt to privatize Ghana’s urban water supply would not have been 
possible had it not been for the support of the World Bank. While privatization had failed in past 
attempts, the growing needs of the sector, and the lack of investment interest from the private 
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sector, made it a good time for the World Bank to offer a large investment opportunity. The 2004 
Urban Water Project proposal outlined two goals. The first goal was to improve access to water 
in urban areas. There was a special emphasis on improving the access, affordability, and 
reliability to clean water to the poor. The second goal was to improve the GWCL in terms of 
their finances and capacity.209 In order to achieve these goals, the World Bank offered a credit of 
US $103 million with additional support from other development agencies. The money was 
allocated for network expansion, improvements to existing infrastructure, development of a 
public-private partnership, improved capacity building and management, and policy reform 
which most notably involved cost cutting within GWCL.210  
The fact that the financing for improvements came completely from the World Bank 
illustrated the shift in thinking that resulted from failed privatizations of the 1990s. While the 
initial attempts to privatize the urban water supply in Ghana had proposed a lease agreement in 
which investment would come from the private sector, the decision was made to switch to a 
management contract because the private sector no longer believed that they could successfully 
complete project objectives in a profitable manner.211 Having the private sector involved through 
management of the sector shows that their knowledge and ability to improve efficiency are still 
valued, but their access to financial capital is no longer necessary or available. If this trend 
continues, it will force countries to rely even more heavily on the World Bank for financial 
assistance, and force countries to accept the conditions that come with its support.   
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Changes After Privatization  
 The five year management contract was signed on November 22, 2005 and made official 
on June 6, 2006. Assessing many key areas of the sector has been difficult due to lack of 
recorded data prior to the project implementation. One of the positive outcomes of private sector 
participation is that there is now accurate data for the present situation that can act as a baseline 
for future projects.212 While some of the original data is not available, there were some key areas 
of reform were still able to be assessed.     
 The area that needed the greatest improvement was unaccounted for water (UFW). In 
2006, at the start of the privatization, UFW was estimated to be 53%. The contract laid out a goal 
of reducing UFW by 5% every year. This was not met, and as of 2010, UFW stood at just under 
50%. The operator claims that delays in meter installation and the rehabilitation of existing 
infrastructure impacted the outcomes.213 This inability to reduce UFW is significant because it 
reduces available water and hurts the sector financially which are both important aspects of 
successful management.  
While this was the greatest negative outcome of the privatization, there were some 
improvements as well. One of the major goals of the project was providing water to the poor at 
affordable costs. While prices did increase as discussed above, an innovative initiative was 
created to help the urban poor in Ghana. The water company Vitens created “Water For Life” as 
a separate foundation that allowed their customers to donate to help extend water services to the 
urban poor. Thus far, over 75,000 people have benefited from this fundraising initiative.214 
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Additional improvements included an increase in water production, an increase in the 
number of connections from 364,000 to 438,000, and an increase in revenue from GHC 57 
million GHC 143 million.215      
 
Water Sector Today  
 In 2011, at the end of the five year contract, the government of Ghana did not renew the 
management contract with AVRL. The Minister of Water Resources, Works and Housing, Alban 
Bagbin stated that, "’From the evidence on the ground, and also, from the players on the field, 
Aqua Vitens could not achieve most of the targets that were set for it.’”216 With the failed 
negotiations, the water sector reverted back to being government owned and operated. While the 
World Bank continues to push for a return to private sector participation, it remains to be seen 
what will occur.217 While the project did bring some improvements and a great deal of 
investment to the sector, overall it was a failure. Unlike the previous two case studies, the 
situation in Ghana is valuable to evaluate because it gives a glimpse into the current state of 
privatization. Future projects will have to rely on the private sector for knowledge rather than 
capital. Additionally, meeting the needs and desires of the public citizens will be increasingly 
important in an age where the ability to mobilize is easier than ever. Moving forward, the 
government of Ghana has a great deal to do to deliver water to those in need in an affordable and 
sustainable manner.  
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Chapter 5: Findings  
 
 After completing the case studies of Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana, there are some clear 
lessons that emerged regarding the viability of privatization as a solution to the global water 
crisis. While each country has a unique history, population, and set of circumstances, there are 
some characteristics that have emerged that if present will either improve or hurt the chances of 
privatization being successful. The final chapter of this paper will discuss these different 
characteristics, return to the debates on privatization, and give a final view on whether 
privatization should continue to be utilized by the World Bank and other development 
organizations as path to improving water access on a global level.  
 
Conditions for Privatization 
 
Planning  
One of the key findings of the case studies was the need to plan out the process prior to 
the implementation of privatization. Senegal represents the model for this condition. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Senegal created a committee that evaluated the needs of the 
sector as well as past water privatization projects in other countries. The agreed upon layout 
clearly defined each party’s responsibilities which led to smoother operations later. Additionally, 
by taking the time to create the financial model, the government and the private operator could 
test different scenarios and understand how the sector would operate. In hindsight, this model 
was accurate and helped eliminate conflict. 
While Senegal models the need for proper planning prior to implementation, there are 
still valuable lessons to be learned from the less successful privatizations in Guinea and Ghana. 
While in Guinea there was time spent looking at different model options, the greatest issue was 
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an unclear breakdown of responsibilities. Without clearly defined roles, the asset holder and the 
private operator had numerous disagreements over their roles. These disagreements hindered the 
ability of each to do their job and slowed progress. Had the two parties taken the time to clearly 
define each entities role, and ensured no overlapping responsibilities, the project would have 
been more successful and achieved better results. 
 In Ghana, the project went through an extended planning phase but the government, 
World Bank, and private operators were never fully on the same page when it came to goals and 
commitment. Numerous delays in the negotiations, and the continued cancellation and restart of 
the project, resulted in a poor start. Ghana illustrates that in order for a privatization project to be 
successful, the planning stages must also be successful. If the project starts disjointed, the 
disagreements it will be hard to move forward with everyone working towards one common 
goal.  
 Moving forward, it is important that the World Bank, national government, and private 
operator all take the needed time to plan the process prior to implementation. Too rash of a 
decision to implement private sector support to any degree will hurt the project’s chance of 
success. By taking the time to plan the timeline, responsibilities, and financing the project is 
more likely to be successful and sustainable.     
 
Contract Type 
 The countries represented in the three case studies utilized three different contracts: lease, 
affermage, and management. One contract was not found to be better than another, but rather, a 
country’s needs determined the choice. It is important to note that the current state of 
privatization will impact the contract options for future projects. Ghana illustrated that due to 
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past privatization failures, private companies are hesitant to contribute investment funds due to 
the financial risk associated with privatization. This current state means that concession, lease, 
and affermage contracts may be less favorable to management contracts.  
 
Regulation  
 While parties can attempt to plan out every scenario ahead of time, issues may still arise. 
It is in these instances that a regulator system must be in place in order to resolve disputes. This 
was an issue in Guinea where there was no independent regulatory body in place. In Senegal, the 
most successful case, there was also not a regulator body but it was argued that a regulatory 
system was built into the affermage contract. While this worked well in Senegal, contracts may 
not be enough regulation for every project, and having an independent regulator in place would 
ensure at the very least a backup for dispute resolution. While a contract may help to create 
defined roles and help solve any potential issues, it is best there be a body independent of the 
government and the private participant(s) that can hear disputes. Finally, it is important that the 
regulator be completely autonomous in its role. In Ghana, there was an attempted to create a 
regulatory body with the creation of the Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC). 
Unfortunately, the World Bank and IMF had a good deal of influence on their operations and 
thus it cannot be seen as a strong regulatory body. If privatization is to reemerge as a focal point 
of water development policy, it should be stressed that all projects have some form of 
independent regulator in place. Regulation is vital and can greatly impact the success of a 
privatization project.      
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World Bank Project Selection   
It is important that the World Bank support privatization projects that will advance the 
sector rather than only supporting projects that are in seriously poor shape. In some ways, all 
three of the case studies completed were of countries where the water sector was inefficient and 
financially unstable. The difference was that the planning done prior helped to set up Senegal to 
be more successful to privatization. The project was not rushed but rather built up in a way that 
took into account the financial stability, the public’s opinions, goals of each party, and needs of 
the sector. The World Bank and any other participating development agencies must fully 
understand, and in some cases improve, a country’s water sector so that privatization is seen as a 
way to advance the operations rather than save it from ruin.    
 
World Bank Financial Support 
The World Bank gets a good deal of criticism for pushing countries into privatization. In 
many of these cases, the targeted country is in dire need of debt forgiveness, or financial support, 
and cannot challenge the World Bank’s conditions. In this respect, the criticisms are just. That 
being said, it is important to note that without the World Bank, none of these privatization 
projects would have been possible. The significant investment supplied by the World Bank 
helped to improve existing infrastructure, build new infrastructure, construct treatment plants, 
and provide administrative training and support. Even for the projects that eventually failed, the 
country and the people benefited from these improvements.      
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Full Cost Recovery  
 One of the major controversies with privatization is whether pricing water to achieve full 
cost recovery is necessary for a successful sector. In simple economic terms, full cost recovery is 
extremely important. To run an operation at any level below where collected revenue is able to 
meet the day to day needs, as well as hold money in reserve, will eventually lead to a break 
down. From looking at the three case studies, it is clear that full cost recovery is important, but 
that it can be achieved in different ways. All three sectors were financially unstable prior to 
privatization. They were selling water at too low a price to cover daily costs, rehab needs, pay off 
accumulated debt, and fund future investments. The trouble arose when it became clear that 
operating at full cost recovery would result in the poorest citizens not being able to afford their 
water. This was especially evident in Guinea where the end of the government subsidy resulted 
in exorbitant prices that left many unable to afford their water. There is no question that water 
operations must be conducted at a level of full cost recovery. In simple business ideology, a 
business must make enough money to cover its costs. To operate below full cost recovery means 
the sector will not be able to cover costs. This will result in the sector deteriorating or requiring 
outside financial support that may not always be available. While operating at full cost recovery 
is vital, there must also be an accompanying social dimension to projects that ensures the poorest 
citizens can still afford this vital resource.      
 
Social Dimension 
 Full cost recovery is necessary, but it should not result in citizens being unable to afford 
to meet their basic water needs. All water privatization models should take into account the 
needs of the poor, and create a social dimension to how the sector is run. Again, Senegal 
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represents the example when it comes to considering the needs of the poor. Senegal implemented 
a scaled tariff where different levels of consumption were charged different amounts. This 
created a cross-subsidy where those consuming more were charged more and helped to pay for 
the lesser charge applied to those using a minimal amount of water. Additionally, while 
somewhat controversial due to the requirements needed to qualify, the social connection program 
has allowed for an increase in the number of poor people connected to the water system. This is 
significant because the cost to connect to the sector can often be too high negating the issue of 
the subsequent cost of water. The privatization in Ghana also implemented a social program 
through the private sector’s creation of the separate “Water For Life”. This venture helped fund 
the connection cost for the poor but did not help with the cost of water. Full cost recovery is vital 
because it ensures that the cost of delivering the services, as well as any future improvement 
cost, are available. A social program is important to ensure that full cost recovery can be 
successful while ensuring the poorest citizens of the community can still meet their basic needs.   
 
Public Support  
  An important consideration for future projects is whether or not to include the public into 
the decision making process that comes with undergoing a privatization process. While none of 
the three cases sought public inclusion, the privatization in Ghana was greatly influence by 
public opposition. The ability of the people of Ghana to come together, and speak out against the 
privatization, helped to delay and bring international attention to the project. In the current state 
of the world, where internet coverage is expanding, and social media allow for an increased 
ability to connect, citizens will have an easier time coming together to speak out against 
privatization. Governments, and private operators, would be smart to include citizens in the 
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decision making process as a way to gain their support. While the different groups may not see 
eye to eye on all aspects of the project, understanding, and acknowledging the public sector’s 
needs and concerns would help gain support for the project.  
 
Understanding the Individual Needs of the Sector  
The conditions presented above do not guarantee the transformation of a failing water 
sector to a level of prosperity. Instead, it lays out a few recommendations that were cultivated 
from the three case studies conducted. It is believed that meeting the above conditions would 
help improve any future water privatization projects chances for success. Every project, and 
country, has a unique set of circumstances and should be viewed based on the individual needs. 
In addition to these conditions, the case studies gave a clearer understanding of some of the 
debates on private participation in the water sector.   
 
The Debates Over Privatization 
 Chapter Two ended with the discussion of a few of the debates over the utilization of 
water privatization. Having conducted the case studies, it is easier to come down on one side or 
the in terms of the debates.  
 
Efficiency or Profit 
The first debate was about whether private sector participation was more efficient or only 
resulted in the introduction of profit hungry companies. After looking at the case studies we see 
evidence for both sides of the debate. In Guinea, the sector was more efficient and better run 
after privatization. This is especially evident when they returned to government control and the 
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sector reverted to many of its poorly managed ways. We also saw that while better managed, 
water became so highly priced that people could not afford their water. Senegal shows that the 
possibility of an efficiently run sector without an over-emphasis on profits. Prices were not 
increased drastically but the sector was better run. Finally, Ghana gives no evidence to this 
claim, as the privatization did not bring increased efficiency. It is clear from the Senegal case 
that is possible to have privatization be more efficient without costs rising excessively in order to 
satisfy the private operators profit needs. Much depends on working relationship and contract 
between the private operator and the government. This point on the necessity of a good working 
relationship goes back to the discussion on thoroughly planning the project prior implementation 
to ensure all parties are on the same page.      
 
Economic Good or Human Right 
 The fact that water has a cost associated with deliver automatically requires that it be 
looked at as an economic good. That being said, the fact that water is vital for human life means 
that it must also be seen as need. Water should be a human right because it is needed to sustain 
life. However, human rights are upheld by both national and international law. If water is to be 
seen as a human right, it must be at the most basic level because most countries do not have the 
capacity or capital to provide every citizen with this resource. As long as countries are working 
towards achieving universal coverage, it should not be seen as infringing on citizen’s human 
rights.  
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Water Pricing  
 Water pricing is one of the more controversial aspects of privatization because of how 
great an impact it has on a country’s citizens. As discussed previously, the best option is to 
ensure that a water sector is operating at a level of full cost recovery but accompanied by social 
programs that ensure that the poorest can still afford water. A level of full cost recovery ensures 
that the sector is financially stable. This is especially important when the World Bank financing 
support comes to an end. As long as a social dimension is also included in the final price of 
water, full cost recovery should not be a major issue.  
 
Impact on Employment  
 The final debate was about the impact of privatization on employees. Those opposed to 
privatization argue that the process results in increased unemployment while proponents argue 
that overtime the unemployed find new jobs due to increased expansion of the sector. The case 
studies show that most likely there will be an increase in unemployment. The severity of the 
increase is dependent on the state of the sector prior to reform. Senegal had a limited increase in 
unemployment because the water sector was already operating at an efficient level. This is rare 
and for most public sectors in developing countries they are operating an inefficient level and 
will see an increase in unemployment. These cuts most often lead to increased efficiency. Guinea 
cut 149 workers and both connections per worker and output per worker improved. While the 
increase in unemployment hurts those involved, it makes the sector more financially stable and 
more efficient in terms of operation. Implementing a program to help train terminated employees 
for other careers could help lessen the social burden of such needed cuts.    
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Conclusion 
 The overarching question guiding this thesis was: is water privatization a bad model that 
perpetuates poverty, or a model that if altered, could serve as the panacea for the global water 
crisis? As with many questions it is not a simple answer.  
 Chapter One outlined the gravity of the problem. With lack of accessible water impacting 
so many people, the need for a large, concentrated effort to bring improvements is vital. Chapter 
Two looked at the history of privatization to assess why the process was believed to be the 
solution to developing countries failing water sectors. Chapter Three looked at the major players 
in the privatization process in order to assess participant’s motives. Chapter Four conducted three 
case studies of Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana in order to learn from their privatization processes. 
Finally, Chapter Five took the information learned from Chapter Four and suggested conditions 
that needed to be satisfied in order to set up a successful privatization.   
 The five chapters resulted in a belief that privatization will not single handedly solve the 
global water crisis but could have a big impact especially in urban areas. For urban citizens, 
lacking efficient and reliable access to water, privatization can bring the needed investment and 
infrastructure to improve the sector enough to meet their needs. Water privatization is only 
viable in urban areas where the expected economic return is high enough to attract private sector 
support. Rural areas have the greatest need for improved access to water and thus privatization 
cannot be seen as the solution to the water crisis. Rather than looking at privatization as an all 
encompassing solution, it should be viewed as a tool that can help improve the urban water 
sector, and that will be most successful given that the previous mentioned conditions are met.  
Moving forward, past failures will limit the amount of capital available from the hesitant 
private sector. It will take increased support from the World Bank, and other development 
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agencies, to provide the financial investment and attract private sector participation. From there, 
parties must be willing to build the sector up to successful accept the privatization and then work 
together to reach specific common goals. The poor history of privatization projects means the 
process should be viewed with hesitation, but also with the understanding that under the right 
circumstances, the process can greatly help a sector and the urban citizens of a country that is in 
need.       
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Appendix  
Chart One  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart One shows the total investment in water and sewage projects between 1991 and 
2001. As is stated in the text, water privatization peeked in 1997 and then fell. Referenced on 
page 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hukka, J.J., and T.S. Katko. Water Privatisation Revisited. Publication. IRC International Water and Sanitation 
Centre, 2003. 91. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. <http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd51/op_priv.pdf>. 
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Chart Two  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart Two shows the relationship between SONEG, SEEG, the Government, and the private 
company for the Guinea water privatization. The most important contract is the lease contract 
between SONEG and SEEG. It is also important to note that the private consortium owns 
51percent of SEEG with the government owning the minority 49 percent. Referenced on page 
45. 
Ménard, Claude, and George Clarke. A Transitory Regime Water Supply in Conakry, Guinea. Publication. The World Bank, Nov. 
1999. 20. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 
 
 
89 
 
Chart Three 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart Three shows the relationships and contracts present in the Senegal water privatization. 
SONES is the State Asset Holding Company and the French water company SAUR owns 
majority stake in SEEG. SONES and SEEG work under a performance contract. SONES and the 
government signed a 30 year concession contract which granted them the right to run the sector. 
Finally, all three signed a ten year affermage contract. Referenced on page 56   
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